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Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management Policy Institutional Architecture Assessment

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Photo: Kelley Lynch

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Acronyms

ADP	Area Development Program
BRE	The Building Resilience in Ethiopia Activity (aka DRM-CB)
BPR	Business Process Re-engineering
CB	Capacity Building
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DE	Development Evaluation
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRMC	Disaster Risk Management Commission
DRM-CB	The Disaster Risk Management - Capacity Building Activity (aka BRE)
EDRMC	Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management Commission
FEWSNET	The Famine Early Warning Systems Network
GoE	The Government of Ethiopia
IA	Institutional Architecture
IAA	Institutional Architecture Assessment
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IP	Implementing Partners
KI	Key Informants
KII	Key Informant Interview
LLC	Limited Liability Company
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Program
PYL	The DRM Professionalization and Youth Leadership Activity
SDRM-SI	Strengthening Disaster Risk Management System and Institutions
TA	Technical Assistance

UN	United Nations
UNDP	The United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program

Executive Summary

Introduction

Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy in Ethiopia has matured from its origins as an emergency relief mechanism in the 1970s to a system whose stated intention is now the management of disaster risk. Just recently, the Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Commission (EDRMC) shifted from the Ministry of Peace to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Moreover, the existing DRM policy is under revision and awaiting approval from the Council of Ministers. While the policy framework for DRM has continually adapted in response to the country's changing political and economic dynamics and to reflect an evolving understanding of disaster management (1993, 2013, and 2022), the institutional arrangements for delivering that policy have not kept pace and in some areas started to decline.

In order to capture a baseline as the EDRMC is repositioned under the PMO and the existing policy is under revision, the evaluation team conducted a DRM policy Institutional Architecture Assessment (IAA) from March-May, 2022. The IAA examines the key systems, processes, and relationships that influence policy development and implementation by examining the country's multi-sector capacity to drive and participate in policy reforms and implementation. The IAA framework has six core policy elements and three-to-five sub-elements under each core element. The core elements include: 1) Guiding Policy Framework, 2) Policy Development and Coordination, 3) Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation, 4) Evidence-based Analysis, 5) Policy Implementation, and 6) Mutual Accountability.

The specific objectives of the IAA include:

- To identify the current performance/capacity gaps, constraints, and opportunities of key DRM lead institutions as well as actors involved in the DRM-related sectors that would influence DRM policy-related Activities in Ethiopia;
- To establish an initial benchmark to measure progress over time to reflect key achievements or milestones in strengthening institutional capacities to better perform as a system, and;
- To disseminate learnings/findings among key stakeholders, including the USAID Mission, policymakers, and DRM lead sector institutions for data-driven adaptation, prioritization, and hopefully streamlined collective action in future action plans.

Methods

A total of 139 Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted with different DRM stakeholder groups (DRMC staff, DRM lead sectors, donors, implementing partners (IPs), private sector actors, and civil society organizations (CSOs)) at the federal, regional (Amhara, Oromia, and Somali), and woreda (two woredas per region) levels. The three regions were selected based on the number of hot-spot woredas in the respective regions as reported by EDRMC. The woredas were selected in consultation with the regional DRMC based on their performance; relatively well-performing and weak-performing Woreda. At least two key informants were identified and interviewed from each participating institution. The Institutional Architecture (IA) Framework was utilized to guide the data collection, analysis, and organization of the report.

Key Findings and Conclusions

Policy Element 1: Guiding Policy Framework

- **Transparency of the DRM policy-making process in Ethiopia is not consistent.** Perceived clarity and consistency of the policy framework and transparency of the policy-making process depend on stakeholders' participation in the policy design process. Participation in the policy design process improves perceived clarity and transparency.

- **EDRMC has an overestimated view of the transparency** of both the current DRM policy and the overarching policy development process when compared to other stakeholders. Donors and implementers feel the second strongest about transparency, and they were the most involved throughout the process.

Policy Element 2: Policy Development and Coordination

- **Overall the DRM policy-making and implementation coordination are weak.** Though EDRMC performs well in collaborating with donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), there is a big gap in coordination with lead sectors and enforcing them to mainstream DRM in their respective work. The coordination is particularly weak between the federal and sub-national levels. Structures such as UN-facilitated clusters, DRM Cluster Committee meetings, woreda-level steering committees, Regional DRM Bureau efforts, or other mechanisms have helped improve coordination.

- **High staff turnover, lack of in-service training, and staff capacity-building efforts** at sub-national levels have challenged civil service technical capacity. While the capacity is available nationally, **legal experts were less involved in the DRM policy-making process.**

- **Exposure to repetitive Disaster Risk Response improves political will overall** as actors look to governments and leaders to take action to prevent future shocks. While repeated emergency response and humanitarian activities are not ideal, the frequency with which they are happening in Ethiopia is starting to enhance the desire to make change.

Policy Element 3: Inclusivity & Stakeholder Engagement

- Despite the Government of Ethiopia's (GoE) perception that they are being inclusive and transparent in DRM Policy design, stakeholder groups do not feel as though they have been included or that the process has been transparent, which has had negative implications on buy-in for DRM policy implementation, preparedness, and emergency response. Data indicates that inclusion has been increasing but is still selective—particularly prioritizing those stakeholders that can support the policy-making process technically and financially, such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and civil society actors.

Policy Element 4: Evidence-Informed Policy-Making

- Even though there are multiple DRM-related data sources from different organizations, evidence relevant for DRM decision-making is not yet produced in a timely manner. Poor coordination, limited resources to conduct DRM-relevant research, poor data utilization practices, and inconsistent data generation methods affected the capacity to generate timely and quality evidence and hence the practice of evidence-informed decision-making.

- IPs perceived evidence-informed policy-making in the DRM space is relatively in good status, most likely because they directly generate much of the evidence that's supposed to be used in the policy process. There have been improvements in the use of evidence for policy in recent years however; for example, the Building a Resilient Ethiopia (BRE) Activity's DRM policy synthesis papers were intensively utilized in the current DRM policy revision process.

Policy Element 5: Policy Implementation

- **The existing DRM policy is poorly implemented** due to factors related to implementation capacity, resource limitations, and transparency issues. The policy implementation process is less transparent for the government lead sectors than for donors and IPs. The policy is poorly mainstreamed in the lead sectors and poorly decentralized at sub-national levels.

- **There are needs for budgeting and financing improvements.** The next series of improvements for DRM in the Ethiopian context are contingent on better financing and budgeting allocations, as this is one of the largest inhibitors to DRM Policy implementation. Proactive DRM preparations can only go so far if there are no dedicated resources to use when taking action, either for preparation or emergency response.

Policy Element 6: Mutual Accountability

- **Mutual accountability is only beginning to emerge or is not yet present across most actors** involved in DRM policy work. One exception to this is in the Somali region, where respondents rated the donor coordination and collaboration sub-element as advanced or institutionalized.

- Though not as strong as it has been previously, **donor coordination and collaboration are relatively strong** within Ethiopia's DRM space enabling actors to hold each other mutually accountable.

Prioritized Recommendations

1. **Strengthen EDRMC's, CSOs', and private sector actors' capacities to develop a guiding framework** that spells out the terms of engagement better and will enable the Government to work jointly with CSOs and Private Sectors on policy development, implementation, and measurement of impact.

    - **Support networking and public-private dialogue forums and joint leadership training events** that can continue to build trust between public, private, and civil society sectors.

2. **USAID should strengthen both direct Activity focus and integrated support across the Mission at sub-national levels** to improve stakeholder engagement (and capacity to engage) in policy development, implementation, and measurement of impact.

3. **The DRM-Capacity Building/BRE Activity should continue their work exploring DRM policy reform and risk financing efforts** and identify where there may be potential overlap opportunities for capacity-building for better policy implementation with PYL, the new DRM Consolidated Activity when it is procured, and with those supporting community DRM planning. Risk Financing efforts should focus on how to strengthen budget distribution and management to the woreda level.

4. **The DRM Professionalization and Youth Leadership Activity (DRM-PYL) must use geo-targeting and the DRM IAA evidence for intern placement to address Woreda-specific capacity challenges**. The DRM IAA evidence should be considered in any curriculum refinement as well.

5. **Consider restarting the DRM Donors Working Group** and other supports that can strengthen mutual accountability.

Introduction, Purpose, and Methods

Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy in Ethiopia has matured from its origins as an emergency relief mechanism in the 1970s to a system whose stated intention is now the management of disaster risk. While the policy framework for DRM has continually adapted in response to the country's changing political and economic dynamics and to reflect an evolving understanding of disaster management (1993, 2013, and 2022), the institutional arrangements for delivering that policy have not kept pace and in some areas started to decline.

Beginning in 2020, the USAID/Ethiopia Mission embarked upon an ambitious, integrated Project to strengthen the capacity of Ethiopia's communities and institutions to effectively manage disaster risks. This five-year Strengthening Disaster Risk Management Systems and Institutions (SDRM-SI) Project (200-2024) is operating in a complex and ever-changing context that requires systems-based and adaptive implementation. With this in mind, the SDRM-SI Project Team is pursuing a Developmental Evaluation (DE), implemented by Headlight Consulting Services, LLC, to help answer the Mission's complex DE Learning Questions and support the adaptation and refinement of USAID/Ethiopia's DRM approach at the strategy, activity, and operational levels.

One of the evaluative efforts the DE team conducted in 2022 is the DRM Institutional Architecture Assessment (IAA). The assessment explored the DRM policy system using the IAA framework to capture a baseline as the Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Commission (EDRMC) is repositioned under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), enabling the DE team and the Project 1 team to make comparisons and better track change and USAID contributions to DRM policy system strengthening over time.

The Institutional Architecture (IA) for improved policy formulation is an innovative approach to create the right policy environment for public and private sector investments[1]. The IAA examines the key systems, processes, and relationships that influence policy development and implementation by examining the country's multi-sector capacity to drive and participate in policy reforms and implementation. This is done by analyzing six policy aspects: 1) Guiding Policy Framework, 2) Policy Development and Coordination, 3) Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation, 4) Evidence-based Analysis, 5) Policy Implementation, and 6) Mutual Accountability.

Objectives and Purpose of the IAA

The main objective of this Institutional Architecture Assessment was to examine DRM policy-related processes among DRM lead sector institutions (as identified in the existing Ethiopia DRM policy document), donors, civil society organizations, private sector actors, and relevant non-governmental implementing partners. This assessment will provide the government of Ethiopia, the USAID/Ethiopia Mission, local policymakers, and other key stakeholders with information on possible constraints that could hinder effective policy change. The IAA will also help to identify appropriate support to address constraints and improve the DRM policy capacity process – including in areas of transparency, predictability, inclusiveness, and evidence-based analysis.

Specific objectives of this IAA are:

- To identify the current performance/capacity gaps, constraints, and opportunities of key DRM lead institutions as well as actors involved in the DRM-related sectors that would influence DRM policy-related Activities in Ethiopia,

[1] Africa Lead II (2013). Institutional Architecture for Food Security Toolkit: Analyst-Led Assessment Guidelines. https://usaidlearninglab.org/resources/institutional-architecture-assessment

- To establish an initial benchmark to measure progress over time to reflect key achievements or milestones in strengthening institutional capacities to better perform as a system, and
- To disseminate learnings/findings among key stakeholders, including the USAID mission, policymakers, and DRM lead sector institutions for data-driven adaptation, prioritization, and hopefully streamlined collective action in future action plans.

Methods

A total of 139 key informant interviews (KII) were conducted with stakeholders from a variety of key groups during the period March-May 2022. The participants included in this assessment were individuals working on DRM and DRM-related activities under DRMC, 10 DRM lead government sectors (Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and Energy; Ministry of Environment and Forestry; Ministry of Federal Affairs; Ministry of Transport; Ministry of Mines; National Defense; and Ministry of Urban Development, Housing, and Construction), selected donors, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), private sector actors and Implementing Partners (IPs).

These groups of key informants were selected purposefully from federal, regional (Amhara, Oromia, and Somali regions), and woreda (two woredas per region) levels. The three regions were selected based on the highest number of hot-spot woredas they have, as reported by EDRMC . In each region, similar to the federal level, the regional DRMC, DRM lead sectors (available at the regional level), CSOs, private sector actors, key donors, and IPs supporting the regional DRMC were included in the assessment. The two woredas were selected in consultation with the regional DRMC based on their performance as relatively well-performing and weak-performing woredas.

At each level at least two key informants were identified from each participating institution. In each participating institution, the institution head was first consulted to identify two appropriate (information reach) key informants. In institutions where there are more DRM-related specialized departments (like the federal and regional DRMC), a minimum of two key informants were selected from each department (see fig. 1).



Figure 1: Sampling Frame

[2] Hotspot Woredas in Ethiopia. (2020). Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX). https://data.humdata.org/dataset/hotspot-woredas-in-ethiopia-by-priorities-january-2020-updates

The Institutional Architecture (IA) Framework was utilized to guide the data collection and analysis. As indicated below and in Annex 1, the IAA tool has different components, including the policy element (the concept), the definition given for the concept, examples to explain the concept further, and maturity questions and maturity rating options. Once the respondent rated the policy element, there was a follow-up question to solicit explanations as to why the respondent rated it that way.

Policy Element	Definition	Example	Question	Maturity Rating
2. Policy Development and Coordination	Policies are designed in adherence to the **guiding policy framework** and a set policy agenda with systemic organization and communication between the **national and regional levels** and with all relevant stakeholders.	N/A	How would you rate the maturity of DRM Policy Development and Coordination in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples that come to mind?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
2.1. Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed	An approved/official **multi-sectoral and multi-year plan** specifies **policy priorities and objectives** and guides policy and program development and implementation.	Government agencies and departments which **implement and utilize multi-year plans** to guide policy and program development Private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs) that represent member interests and provide input that helps inform priorities and planning	How would you assess DRM Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

Respondents were asked to rate Ethiopia's DRM-related performance against each of the six core policy elements and sub-elements on a scale of one ("not present") to five ("institutionalized") and explain the rating and/or provide examples of that sub-element in action from their perspective of the policy system in a narrative response. The resulting quantitative and qualitative data were distilled into key conclusions, findings, and recommendations. The quantitative data were analyzed using SPSS and Tableau Public to compare average maturity rating scores by the level of assessment, stakeholder groups, and regions. The qualitative data were coded and analyzed using Dedoose qualitative software.

Findings

Below the findings are organized into Modules according to the different policy elements and sub-elements. Our evaluation team has also developed a Tableau dashboard to generate visualizations if readers are interested in different ways to view the information. For each policy element and sub-element, first, the quantitative findings are presented, followed by the qualitative detail, and then conclusions and recommendations follow. Overall, the Ethiopia DRM policy design and implementation has an average rating score of 2.6, identifying it as an emergent capacity. Of the six core policy elements, "Evidence-Informed Policy-Making" and "Mutual Accountability" have the highest and least maturity ratings, with 2.78 and 2.14 total maturity ratings, respectively. Of the sub-policy elements, private sector accountability is the lowest maturity rating with only a 1.5 total score which is almost non-existent. On the other hand, political will was rated relatively highest with a total score of 2.9, almost expanding (See fig. 2).



Figure 2: Ethiopia DRM Policy Institutional Architecture Assessment Maturity Rating Total Score

Policy Element 1: Guiding Policy Framework

Overall, the guiding policy framework maturity is rated 2.78, which is almost expanding. The ratings vary based on levels of assessment. The rating is better at the federal level than at the sub-national level (3.26 at the federal level versus 2.59 at the regional level and 2.14 at the woreda level). Somali region participants rated this policy element the lowest compared to the Amhara and Oromia regions. Compared to all other stakeholder groups, DRMC participants rated the guiding policy framework the highest with an average maturity score of 3.47, which is growing to advanced, and the private sector actors rated it the lowest as emergent, with a total score of 2.00 (See fig. 3).



Figure 3: Ethiopia DRM Policy IAA Maturity Rating Total Score by Stakeholder Group

Ethiopia's DRM policy is revised periodically through intensive reviews and working sessions to examine whether or not previous policy components are still applicable and appropriate (3 excerpts from 3 sources). For example, the 2013 DRM policy was ratified after thorough revision and will continue to be amended based on evolutions in the operating context.



Figure 4: Ethiopia DRM Policy IAA Maturity Rating Total Score by Level of Assessment and Regions

Clearly Defined and Consistent Policy Framework (Sub-Element 1.1)

Clearly-defined Policy Framework results in good policies that are well-drafted, consistent, and easy to manage and update. In this assessment, the average score for clarity and consistency of the Policy Framework is 2.86, which is almost expanding. The ratings vary depending on the level of assessment and by stakeholder groups. This sub-element has relatively better ratings from DRMC key informants, rated between expanding and advanced (with an average score of 3.29) and the lowest from private sectors rated as emergent (an average score of 2.00). The DRM policy design was perceived as clean and consistent, relatively better at the federal level (an average score of 3.36) than at the sub-national level (an average score of 2.60 at the regional level and 2.17 at the woreda level); see Fig. 5 - 7 below.



Figure 5: Guiding Policy Framework by Level of Assessment

Comprehensive and Clearly Defined Policy

Participants voiced that the Ethiopian DRM policy is a comprehensive policy as it considers the three disaster phases—pre-, during- and post-disaster phases—and focuses on a multi-hazard approach (8 excerpts from 7 sources). For example, one of the key informants representing federal level CSOs, stated, "*the previous policy, that is, the one which preceded the current policy, had been framed focused on disaster response. The focus was still on a single hazard drought. The*

existing policy, first it is made to have a multi-hazard focus. Second, since it classifies the disaster phases theoretically into three phases; pre-disaster that contains the preparedness, prevention and mitigation measures; Next the disaster phase-i.e. when the actual disaster occurs that contains the response mechanism and the post disaster phases the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction measures and linking these measures to a sustainable development. From that perspective, I believe that the policy framework is complete." Additionally, key informants both at the federal (4 excerpts from 4 sources) and regional (8 excerpts from 7 sources) levels felt that the Ethiopia DRM policy is well-defined and clearly articulated (13 excerpts from 12 sources). This finding is common among key informants from federal and regional DRM Commission (6 excerpts from 6 sources), particularly those in Amhara (3 excerpts from 3 sources) and Somali (4 excerpts from 3 sources) regions.

Lacks Legal Framework

The current DRM Policy lacks a supportive legal framework, and it is unclear what will happen to the lead sectors or other stakeholders if they fail to execute their responsibilities and obligations as per the policy (8 excerpts from 8 sources). For example, "*The policy sets out how to work in coordination. However, it does not specify what punishment the non-responsible party will face. What is being done is based on the cooperation of organizations and officials. How to fulfill the obligation and responsibility but there is no ethical or punishment if they don't do their responsibility and obligation. If stakeholders take it as their own matter and obligation.*"



Figure 6: Guiding Policy Framework by Region



Figure 7: Guiding Policy Framework by Stakeholder Group

Conclusion

Perceived clarity and consistency of the policy framework depend on stakeholders' participation in the policy design process. Those who participated in the policy design process perceived that the policy framework is clearly defined and is comprehensive by considering multiple relevant hazards and the different phases of disaster risk management. However, those stakeholders who did not participate in the policy design process but are currently implementing it perceived it as inconsistent and unclear. The latter feel that the guiding framework lacks a legal framework and needs further advocacy work.

Transparency of the Policy-Making Process (Sub-Element 1.2)

The existing DRM policy design process was perceived as not transparent by the majority of the stakeholders. Comparing the different stakeholder groups, DRMC key informants (KIs) rated it as advanced (average score of 4.00), whereas DRM lead sectors and the private sector KIs rated it as not existing (with 1.3 and 1.00 total scores, respectively). Donors and IPs rated transparency as expanding. Considering the level of assessment, the policy design process was perceived as almost advanced (total score of 3.67) at the federal level but as not existing at the sub-national level, with total scores of 1.90 and 1.29 at the regional and woreda levels, respectively.

Information-sharing Mechanisms

EDRMC and international non-governmental organization (INGO) staff working at the federal and regional levels indicated that there is an information-sharing mechanism and that policy drafts have been shared with stakeholders multiple times throughout the process (12 excerpts and 11 sources). Policy familiarization and review have been conducted using forums, meetings, training, and document sharing using emails. A wide range of stakeholders, including government sectors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), were involved in the policy development process. For example, one source said, "*we have discussed it in detail starting from our commission workers such as directors and senior experts; then with regions and the parliament DRM implementing committee: with CSO such as religious leaders: with opposition parties; concerned directors and experts from federal sectors; and at least with all state ministers lead agencies not by writing letters rather through physical presence and personal confirmation.*"

The Policy-Making Process is Not Transparent

Many participants stated that the policy development process lacked sufficient transparency (31 excerpts from 25 sources). The level of awareness of the policy widely varies among stakeholders, including among government sector offices. The level of transparency, engagement, and knowledge of the policy is relatively better at the federal level but decreases at the regional level and diminishes even further at the woreda level. Many stakeholders have very little knowledge about the policy, while others heard about the policy through training, by reading online policy documents, or by participating as informants to the policy. Additionally, participants shared that the DRM policy is not contextualized as it lacks sufficient input from regional and woreda level stakeholders. For instance, a respondent from the Somali region shared that "*the policy-making process is not transparent and not contextualized to the fact [reality] of our [Somali] region.*"

Conclusion

The policy development process is expected to be transparent, known to all stakeholders, and pertinent information and changes to the process communicated openly and clearly to all stakeholders in accordance with the rules contained within the country's constitution, basic law, and elsewhere in the formal legal framework. However, the perceived transparency of the Ethiopian DRM policy design process is inconclusive and depends on the level of participation of the stakeholders in the policy design process. Most of the stakeholders who participated in the policy design process feel the process was transparent. They explain the transparency of the process by describing the presence of information-sharing mechanisms and timely feedback. There is an information-sharing mechanism, and the policy drafts have been shared with stakeholders multiple times. Policy familiarization and review have been conducted using different communication channels. On the other hand, stakeholders who did not participate in the policy design process perceived that there was no transparency, especially at the sub-national level. The level of transparency, engagement, and knowledge of the policy is relatively better at the federal level but decreases at the regional level and further diminishes at the woreda level.

Clearly Defined Institutional Responsibilities (Sub-Element 1.3)

Overall, the respondents perceived the maturity of the DRM policy design clarity of the institutional responsibility as emergent, almost expanding (total score of 2.74). The institutional responsibility seems relatively clearer for federal-level stakeholders compared to the sub-national level KIs (with total scores of 3.11 versus 2.65 and 1.71 at the regional and woreda levels). Again, KIs from DRMC rated this sub-element as almost advanced, the private sector KIs perceived maturity of this sub-element as non-existent, and all other stakeholder groups rated it between emergent and almost expanding. There is not much difference among the regions as total scores range from 2.45 to 2.73.

Clear Roles and Responsibilities

Across the federal, regional, and woreda levels of assessment, various types of IAA respondents indicated that there are clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the different sectors and regions implementing DRM work, especially in the Somali region (18 excerpts, 15 sources). For example, "*[The government officials] have made [DRM] to be evaluated by three different government organs. The first one is the Ministry of Plan Commission, which evaluates and approves all sectors plans. It rejects the plan if DRM activities are not included in the sectoral plans. The second one is the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, which allocates and mobilizes the necessary resources if they have included DRM activities.*" A representative group of stakeholder respondents indicated that in addition to clearly defined roles and responsibilities, the DRM guiding framework has been useful to exhaustively identify stakeholders, break DRM into phases, inform implementers how DRM can be mainstreamed, and provide overarching strategic direction on DRM Policy (6 excerpts, 6 sources).

DRM Mainstreaming

According to multiple sources, the lack of sharing roles and responsibilities with each specific stakeholder was the main shortage in the current Ethiopian DRM policy guide and frameworks (17 excerpts from 16 sources). The policy had a gap in mentioning in clear language for each participant institution's and sectors' roles and responsibilities when they engaged in DRM activities which creates ambiguity. Even if the roles and responsibilities were stated in the Ethiopian DRM Policy guide and framework, they were unclear, vaguely stated, or did not pan out practically in implementation (5 excerpts, 5 sources). As one respondent said, "*I don't think that the policy has clearly and exhaustively stated the responsibility of the sectors. Though all the sectors have participated in the process I think it is difficult to make a clear distinction among the responsibilities of the sectors.*" Executing the roles and responsibilities designed in the Ethiopian DRM Guide was a key factor for the success of implementation of the policy, but from the sector offices' sides, specifically from the regional and woreda levels, there was insufficient ownership of the activities from and within the policy framework (3 excerpts from 3 source). Implementers focused primarily on their specific tasks instead of also chipping in to take on their allocated shares of DRM support, causing delays and missed opportunities for coordination and collaboration along the way.

Conclusion

As DRM is a multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder field, clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders can help them to look beyond their own individual sectors and learn to understand and value the unique contributions of one another. It also helps them to recognize that overall success is a function of shared responsibility and ownership. Thus, the DRM policy is expected to clearly and explicitly outline the roles and responsibilities of the different DRM stakeholders.

However, the issue of whether the Ethiopian DRM policy clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders is inconclusive as the data triangulated for both positive and negative perceptions about clearly defined roles and responsibilities, with many respondents pointing out that even if responsibilities are documented in the policy, they do not pan out in practical implementation. A majority of those stakeholders participating in the policy design process feel the policy clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders, whereas those who did not participate feel that the reverse is true. Having poorly defined stakeholders' roles and responsibilities in the policy results in a lack of ownership and hence poor mainstreaming and implementation of the activities.

Policy Element 1 Recommendations

1. EDRMC must ensure the DRM policy-making process is transparent, known to all stakeholders and DRM actors, and pertinent information and changes to the process are communicated openly and clearly to all stakeholders in accordance with the formal legal framework. There should be opportunities for the public to comment on draft policies. Effective engagement in the policy design process provides an opportunity for the stakeholders to understand the process and contribute to clarification and ownership of their roles and responsibilities. For this to happen, EDRMC should identify an exhaustive list of stakeholder groups at each administrative level (federal, region, woreda, etc.), identify and implement a clear stakeholder engagement strategy, even if additional consultation are needed for the current reform process, and mobilize adequate budget for policy advocacy and sensitization activities.

2. The USAID/SDRM-SI team should work with its partners (both implementers and other donors) to ensure there are enough resources, resource management mechanisms, and coordination for effective engagement of the relevant stakeholders at all levels in the policy design process. The SDRM-SI Project can leverage the DRM-CB/BRE Activity to continue its work supporting the DRM policy reform and DRM financing efforts.

Policy Element 2: Policy Development and Coordination

The DRM policy development and coordination process maturity status in Ethiopia was generally rated as emergent, moving to expanding. The ratings vary depending on the level of assessment, stakeholder groups, and region. This sub-element rated lowest at the sub-national level compared to their federal counterparts (see Fig. 8). The DRM policy development and coordination process maturity has perceived relatively better status by DRMC and IPs key informants than other stakeholder groups (see Fig. 9). The different regions gave almost similar maturity ratings for this policy element (see Fig. 10).

Figure 8: Policy Development and Coordination by Level of Assessment

Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed (Sub-Element 2.1)

Overall, the sub-element "policy agenda and priorities developed" was rated as emergent, progressing to expanding (total score of 2.77). The federal-level KIs rated it as expanding, progressing to advanced, while the sub-national level rated it as emergent (see Fig. 8 and 9). Considering stakeholder categories, the higher maturity rating for this sub-element was given by IPs (total score 3.42) followed by DRMC key informants (total score 3.29). Regarding the region level, the lowest maturity rating score comes from the Oromia region (see Fig. 9 and 10).



Figure 9: Policy Development and Coordination by Region

Multi-Year Plans

Some evidence suggests that multi-year plans with specific policy priorities and objectives have been developed (7 excerpts and 6 sources). For instance, one source said, "*The Ethiopian government's ten-year development plan has included the DRM policy priorities.*" During the data collection, it was evident that respondents at the federal level were more engaged and more knowledgeable compared to other respondents from the region or woreda (6 excerpts and 5 sources).

Improved Multi-Hazard DRM Policy Design

Evidence indicates that there has been an improvement in the policy design practice (9 excerpts from 9 sources). Unlike the previous policies, the recent policy encourages multi-agency disaster risk management, and it includes other disaster types besides droughts, such as floods. The recent

policy is more focused on risk management than disaster management and considers the latest international standards or guidelines such as sustainable development strategy and the Sendai Framework. For instance, one key informant said the DRM policy has "shifted from mono to multi-hazard approach and besides it indicated the focus from disaster management to risk management." The policy agenda and priorities also consider the most commonly occurring disasters such as drought, flooding, and conflict, with disasters categorized and prioritized (9 excerpts and 9 sources). A lead sector key informant said, though there is a challenge during implementation, "the categorization and prioritization of the disaster was made by adopting internationally accepted methods and contextualization to the country." Stakeholders at the federal level, particularly civil society organizations (3 excerpts and 3 sources) and INGOs (3 excerpts and 3 sources) agree on the improvement made in the DRM policy, such as its inclusion in the country's multi-year plan, consideration of multiple hazards, and its M&E component. Another area this is evident is around the use of woreda profiling to generate evidence and prioritize agendas properly (3 excerpts and 3 sources). Woreda profiling has been done for 400 woredas, and of those, 200 woredas have DRM plans which are then shared with all sectors.

Respondents were careful to mention that policy agendas and priorities are not exhaustive enough to reflect the context of the country and the challenges it is facing (11 excerpts and 9 sources). The foci of policy priorities are mainly on natural disasters, challenges of the rural community, responses, and food access, but there is a need to analyze the context and expand the policy to include human-induced disasters, urban community challenges, mitigation measures, and other support needed. Similarly, sources from the Somali region indicated that regional priorities and agendas are not considered in the policy development process (5 excerpts and 3 sources). This is illustrated as "*the policy agenda and priorities were not developed by engaging all the concerned sectors from different regions and their priorities were not considered at all.*" Another respondent from EDRMC expressed his concern that more collaboration with the Planning and Development Commission is needed to provide technical support and ensure the DRM priorities are fully considered and mainstreaming is improved.

Conclusion

DRM priorities were recently included in Ethiopia's ten-year development plan. However, more collaboration and coordination with the Planning and Development Commission are needed to provide technical support and ensure the DRM priorities are fully considered and mainstreamed into each and every DRM stakeholder's plan. The existing DRM policy priorities also primarily focus on selected natural disasters, mainly on drought, ignoring human-induced disasters and other supports needed in addition to food items provision. The current revision is expected to include many of these missed hazards. Moreover, during the policy design process, there was minimal participation from the sub-national level, and the sub-national level priorities were not considered in the existing policy.

Established Policy Process with Dedicated Resources (Sub-Element 2.2)

The total maturity rating score for this sub-element was less than three at all levels of assessment, at different regions, and by all stakeholder groups, including those KIs representing DRMC. The rating is relatively higher at the federal level than at the sub-national level, and a relatively higher score was given by DRMC, donors, and IPs. This sub-element is rated as not yet present by DRM lead sectors and private sector actors, and in the Somali region and at woreda levels (see Fig. 8-10).

Budget Allocated for the Policy Design



Figure 10: Policy Development and Coordination by Stakeholder Category

Some respondents identified that there was budget support and allocation for Ethiopian DRM Policy design from the Government of Ethiopia, World Bank, USAID, and other NGOs contributing to reducing the resource challenge for designing the policy (7 excerpts from 7 sources). A source indicated, "In addition to those resources have been dedicated/allocated by both the government and the projects. For instance, Building Resilence in Ethiopia, a USAID-funded project, internally we have been using the regular government budget and after observing our implementation the World Bank has also allocated a huge amount of money, nearly three hundred million Euro and we have almost finalized the document preparation and reached an agreement. As a result, we don't have any resource challenges." Budget support was observed at the federal and regional levels (3 excerpts from 3 sources).

Sufficient Human Resources and Technical Support During Policy Design

The government offices, like EDRMC which was responsible for designing the Ethiopian DRM policy framework, received technical assistance (TA) from NGOs, CSOs, UN Agencies, and Universities like Bahir Dar through the policy process. TA providers were supporting the offices through the provision of human resources for the design process, and the government also worked with consultants who had sufficient knowledge of DRM. The government itself also provided technical staff for the design process from its sector offices after providing capacity training (6 excerpts from 6 sources). As a KI respondent said, "*The federal government was delivering training for the regional stakeholders under the title of 'DRM policy sensitization'; and the regional government was providing the training to other stakeholders under the same title. It was*

conducted at zonal and woreda levels. The key emphasis was mainstreaming the policy in all sectors since disaster management is not a task merely addressed by the DRMC." Stakeholders and partners also provided financial and human resource support (5 excerpts from 5 sources).

Limited Budget for the Policy Design

According to multiple sources, the policy designing and making process was not supported by dedicated resourcing and budget from EDRMC or the federal government (25 excerpts from 23 sources/8 excerpts from 8 sources). However, it was done through an ad-hoc basis budget and was covered by donors like BRE for policy design (5 excerpts from 4 sources). In instances where funding was included for DRM in the annual budget, it did not cover more than basic salaries and administrative costs, making the amount insufficient for both policy design and implementation. One participant shared, "*I don't think that the DRM policy-making process was different from other policies. It was not supported by an adequate budget that enabled experts to prepare a full-fledged policy document.*"

In addition to financial resources, there were **limitations with skilled technical experts** like leveraging trained legislative staff for designing the DRM policy framework and guide (9 excerpts from 9 sources). Finally, there was also **less resource mobilization coordination** during the Ethiopian DRM policy framework and guideline design (5 excerpts from 4 sources), so available resources were misused and dispersed across efforts instead strategically spent. A source states that "*There is not that much organized dedicated resources established in the policy process, rather resources are scattered here and there in the hands of the different stakeholders.*"

Conclusion

There is a dedicated unit coordinating the policy design process; EDRMC. However, there was insufficient funding allocated to support the policy-making process, and the available funding was not strategically spent. Rather the policy-making process had been supported financially and technically by donors and NGOs. Shortage of resources for the policy design process affects inclusivity and stakeholder engagement as well as conducting policy advocacy and sensitization activities.

Coordination Process (Sub-Element 2.3)

Overall, the sub-element “Coordination Process'' was rated as emergent, progressing to expanding (total score of 2.72). The federal-level KIs rated it as expanding, progressing to advanced, while the sub-national level rated it as emergent (see Fig. 7 and 8). Considering stakeholder categories, the higher maturity rating for this sub-element was given by IPs (a total score of 3.50) followed by DRMC key informants (a total score of 3.36). Oromia region KIs rated the maturity of the DRM policy design coordination process as not yet present (see Fig. 8-10).

Respondents indicated that having structures in place has helped ensure that coordination is happening. These structures can take the form of UN-facilitated clusters, DRM Cluster Committee meetings, woreda-level steering committees, Regional DRM Bureau efforts, or other mechanisms. Among these various bodies, a handful of respondents also identified an emergent culture of coordination among multiple layers of the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) (e.g., good coordination between regional and federal levels, training among federal, regional, and zonal levels, etc.). Regional DRM Bureaus are the key leaders in engaging other Bureaus during responses, especially for coordinating financial and human resources for improved disaster response. Although not triangulated, one source mentioned that "During the emergency time the coordination process looks good since the entire bureau heads are responsible for the specific role of their bureau. But at normal time due to the lack of scientific evidence there is not that much coordination among bureaus" indicating there is a difference in what works during different times in the DRM cycle.

Interviewees indicated that there is poor coordination and engagement among federal and sub-national stakeholders (12 excerpts from 12 sources), including challenges around political influence, lack of proper documentation, faulty organizational structure, and staff turnover (6 excerpts from 6 sources). These challenges were raised more frequently by key informants from the regions, particularly in the Amhara region. Additionally, there is poor collaboration with other stakeholders (7 excerpts from 5 sources). For example, *"Though the commission is performing well in communicating with the stakeholders, in identifying resource sources and addressing disasters, there is a great gap in the other sectors that they do not even integrate and plan the DRM tasks with their specific activities. The main gap is the commission lacks to coordinate the sectors and enforce them to include disaster-related activities in their plan and helps them on how to be proactive for disasters so that when the disaster occurs they can be resilient..."* Respondents also explained that part of the issue inhibiting coordination has been inadequate and non-transparent two-way communication among stakeholders (4 excerpts from 4 sources). For example, *"During the 2015, 2016 and 2017 drought, there was lack of transparency. There was coordination. But there was one technical group established that provides feedback to the DRM council. It was composed of only government offices. Donors and NGOs were not included. It was influenced by political perspectives. But on the other side, there was a DRM technical working group. There was an Emergency Coordination Centre. They took information but they didn't share the consolidated information with transparency."*

Conclusion

Overall DRM policy-making and implementation coordination are weak. Though EDRMC performs well in collaborating with donors and NGOs, there is a big gap in coordination with lead sectors and enforcing them to mainstream DRM in their respective work. The coordination is particularly weak between the federal and sub-national levels. Structures such as UN-facilitated clusters, DRM Cluster Committee meetings, woreda-level steering committees, Regional DRM Bureau efforts, or other mechanisms have helped improve coordination.

Technical Capacity (Sub-Element 2.4)

Technical capacity for Ethiopia's DRM policy design was perceived as relatively strong (expanding progressing to advanced) at the federal level and by KIs from DRMC, donors, and IPs. However, the private sector KIs rated it as not yet present. No big difference was observed among the three regions (see Fig. 8-10).

Skilled People Participated in the Policy Design

Federal level key informants (8 excerpts from 8 sources), particularly those representing EDRMC (4 excerpts from 4 sources), and civil society organizations (3 excerpts from 3 sources) described that experts were involved during the DRM policy design process (13 excerpts from 13 sources). For example, "*In the first place, we have assessed and identified those individuals having good knowledge and capacity on DRM Policy framework development process in Ethiopia and then wrote them a letter of invitation namely to each concerned sectoral office. For example, from the Ministry of Water and Energy, the Minister of Water Resource State Minister; from Ministry of Peace, Dr. Siyoum, who is a part of the policy development process; from police commission; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Environmental Protection; and different stakeholders such as from judiciary office; opposition political parties; religious leaders. etc. who are highly professionalized expertise have participated and provided sufficient input onto it. So that we don't have any technical capacity problems in this regard.*" Additionally, respondents report that government actors' DRM-related skills are getting better over time, increasing the number of people skilled in DRM (6 excerpts from 6 sources). For example, one of the key informants representing the donor stakeholder group said, "*I think the capacity and knowledge there may be better at higher level and lower at sub-national level but increasing from time to time. I see important progress from time to time in this*

aspect. Continuous training is important for institutional development; that is not only improving an individual's capacity but also the institutional system to grow from time to time. Institutional capacity-building is crucial."

Lack of Skilled Staff

Multiple participants indicated that there is a lack of DRM-skilled multidisciplinary staff in the Ethiopia DRM sectors (8 excerpts from 8 sources), especially at the regional level (8 excerpts from 8 sources) and particularly in Oromia (4 excerpts from 4 sources). Respondents also indicated that DRM policy and the lead institution are not adequately and consistently supported (6 excerpts, 6 sources). EDRMC's mandate or level of authority has been fluctuating over the years as it has moved from office to office (MoA, MoP, and Deputy PM Office), which has affected its technical and implementation capacity and its role in leading the coordination of responses. One respondent suggested that DRM should be strengthened with a "*legal framework, and then offices will become accountable accordingly. Whether there is a disaster or not, they should do what they should do. If there is no disaster, there is preparedness, prevention, and mitigation. After a disaster, there is rehabilitation and reconstruction. It is something that can not be stopped [as it is seasonal].*"

Lack of Training and Capacity Building

In terms of continuing to build experience for staff, interviewees shared that there is a lack of training and experience sharing and hence a significant need for training and experience sharing opportunities in the DRM space (6 excerpts from 5 sources). For example, "*It is emergent because so far there is no training given to the workers on the policy and no experience sharing among regional bureaus to share their best practice and how the policy is being implemented.*" This was especially mentioned by regional and woreda interviewees as there is a critical lack of DRM skilled staff at the sub-national level (5 excerpts, 5 sources) and a need for capacity-building training for DRM staff (6 excerpts, 6 sources).

Staff Turnover Issues

There is an issue of high staff turnover for existing government staff, especially in the Somali region (3 excerpts from 3 sources), due to a lack of adequate incentives and more attractive salaries in non-government organizations, which has caused a drain of the government's DRM sector technical capacity (5 excerpts from 5 sources). One of the key informants shared, "*I believe there is knowledge nationally. But there is no incentive in the government office and the turnover is high. You can't retain your capacity. That is a very critical problem. There is capacity among partners. And it is they who are taking that capacity or human power from the government. This includes us. There is capacity in the non-government institutions. But the capacity in the government institutions is affected by turnover.*" With insufficient existing capacities, technical capacity gaps have often been filled by ex-pats who rotate out shortly after providing their expertise (4 excerpts, 4 sources).

Conclusion

Overall, skilled experts are relatively concentrated at the federal level especially working for NGOs and donors. In order to utilize this skilled manpower, stakeholder engagement during the DRM policy design process often becomes more selective and involves more participants from the federal level and from donors and NGOs. This selective stakeholder engagement process has contributed to the limited participation of stakeholders at the sub-national level. On the other hand, while the capacity is available nationally, legal experts were less involved in the DRM policy-making process. This might be the reason why the existing DRM policy lacks a supportive legal framework, resulting in limited DRM mainstreaming activity by the DRM lead sectors. Additionally, high staff turnover, lack of in-service training, and staff capacity-building efforts at the sub-national levels have challenged civil service technical capacity.

Political Will (Sub-Element 2.5)

The political will was rated as emergent, progressing to expanding (a total score of 2.88). The federal-level informants rated it as expanding, progressing to advanced (a total score of 3.35), while the sub-national level informants rated it as emergent, progressing to expanding (see Fig. 7 and 8). Considering stakeholder categories, the higher maturity rating for this sub-element was given by DRMC (a total score of 3.60), followed by IPs (a total score of 3.50). No big difference is observed among the three regions, and in all regions, political will was rated as emergent, progressing to expanding (see Fig. 8-10).

Positive Attitudes

Interviewees from the Lead Sector, CSOs, EDRMC, Academia, and IPs indicated that there is generally a positive attitude among political leaders towards DRM response (16 excerpts, 16 sources). Although not specifically triangulated, some respondents pointed out that the current government administration is more accepting and willing to prioritize and address disaster response and related issues. Many of these responses lack more information as to how they know political will does exist, but the fact that this perception is widespread among multiple types of stakeholders across multiple regions provides a degree of evidence even without an explanation of how or why. Furthermore, interviewees in the Somali area indicated that the political will of regional leadership is improving as opportunities for education are provided and leaders come in with NGO backgrounds (10 excerpts, 9 sources).

Leaders Participate in Processes and Formulate Policy

Interviewees focusing on the federal and regional levels indicated that one positive sign of political will was that various leaders were willingly involved in the drafting of policy, coordination of activities, and supporting DRM response mechanisms (13 excerpts, 11 sources). Respondents strongly suggested that this active participation in various parts of DRM work can be taken as a sign of their interest in identifying crises and suggesting solutions accordingly. Beyond a generally receptive attitude and participation in processes, respondents also asserted that many government officials are working to push for more timely execution of the policy and provide constructive feedback for policy development (10 excerpts, 10 sources). This was especially agreed upon by those at the federal and regional levels of assessment.

Political leaders feel DRM is less important than other sectors and show less commitment in terms of allocating adequate budget and human resources (12 excerpts from 12 sources). One respondent illustrated this as, "*I don't think that a certain policy is framed and developed without a political will. It was certainly backed by the then political leadership. The question is, was the support to the desired level? The answer is No. Because had it been fairly supported by the political leadership, inadequacies in budget and insufficiencies in human resources wouldn't have occurred. Another indicator of this is they didn't establish the required structure for the lower level of the community. How come without structure is a political will possible?*" Some participants, especially those at the regional (Oromia) and woreda levels, explained this as a result of political leaders lacking DRM-related capacity and knowledge instead of a political will issue, hence their low/non-existent commitment (8 excerpts, 8 sources). High turnover of the political leaders also challenged political commitments and will toward DRM (4 excerpts from 4 sources). This is illustrated by one respondent who shared, "*As you may observe the situation of our country, one minister or deputy minister might be transferred to another [sector] in a short period of time. The new one might know nothing about what a specific sector is doing in terms of emergency response...The political will is existing but it is being affected by the turn over.* "

Finally, a handful of interviewees highlighted that Ethiopia's DRM activities are pushed more by donors than the government's will (3 excerpts from 3 sources). One source shared, "*I think all the development of DRM was more pushed by the donors' will than the government will in the past ... and*

I can still feel reliant a lot from donor resources ... external support I believe has also some influence. So, there is still a long way to go to reach to see the willingness of the government. For example, the PSNP program which was started in 2005 to graduate a number of beneficiaries with the government to take over the program. But after 20 years the fund is still from external donors and the number of graduates is really very very low. It shows that somehow the risk part is functioning but the development part needs some change."

Conclusion

The strength of DRM-related political will depends on the type of indicators considered to describe political will. For example, considering attitudes towards DRM response, participation in the process of policy design and implementation, and provision of leadership and constructive feedback demonstrates a general positive political will and commitment to DRM activities in Ethiopia. However, if you consider commitments in budget and human resource allocation, the political will for DRM policy design and implementation is generally weak. The impression that DRM-related activities are pushed forward more by the donors will than the government's political will demonstrates insufficient political will.

Policy Element 2 Recommendations

1. EDRMC, which coordinates the DRM policy design process, should ensure that adequate budget and other resources are secured before starting the policy design process so that all categories of stakeholders at all administrative levels have a chance to participate and to ensure their concerns and ideas are included and prioritized in the policy and associated agenda. While including the DRM priorities into the country's ten-year development plan is a big achievement, EDRMC, donors, and implementing partners should follow up and support the proper incorporation of DRM by the lead sectors into their own policy agendas and strategic plans. Capacity-building interventions should be provided to the Ministry of Planning and Development, Ministry of Finance, and other lead sectors to ensure strong management and implementation of the DRM mainstreaming plan and policy.

2. EDRMC should make sure an adequate budget is available for all parts of the policy-making and implementation process, **with a strategic spend-down plan** before policy reform efforts begin. This could be done by advocating with the Ministry of Finance or the Prime Minister's Office to allocate additional budget using past years' budget data to clearly articulate the resourcing gaps or by mobilizing resources from different potential sources (private sector, donors, etc.).

3. The Government of Ethiopia needs to design technical capacity retention incentive packages to minimize high staff turnover and should minimize the frequent shift of political leadership positions, as well as the moving of EDRMC itself. Moreover, the government should work with donors and implementing partners to arrange more in-service training for staff, focusing more on the training of trainers for sustainability. In this regard, USAID/SDRM-SI and their IPs should support GoE staff retention capacity through human resource management capacity-building through its implementing partners. The Mission should also robustly support and adaptively manage the DRM Professionalization and Youth Leadership Activity (PYL) Activity to support capacity-building.

4. The USAID/SDRM-SI team should ensure there are sufficient resource management, coordination, forecasting, and mobilization capacity-building interventions integrated into the Disaster Response Activity, and that those build off of the work done by the DRM-Capacity Building Activity (DRM-CB) to date. The Mission should continue to leverage the DRM-CB in the interim to support DRM finance reform efforts and identify where there may be potential to consider the policy design and advocacy process in the financial reform.

5 USAID/SDRM-SI Project, in collaboration with Government and other donors, should strengthen, leverage, and, where possible, consolidate coordination structures/platforms such as UN-facilitated clusters, DRM Cluster Committee meetings, Regional DRM counsel, woreda-level steering committees, etc. to coordinate DRM policy design and implementation. Moreover, the USAID/SDRM-SI project, other donors, and their respective implementing partners should encourage the Government of Ethiopia to conduct After Action Reviews and support adaptive cycles implementing the lessons learned, such as replicating/continuing effective coordination mechanisms during more stable times as well. Similarly, the Government of Ethiopia, particularly EDRMC, should strengthen effective, transparent, and consolidated communication channels between and among the different DRM stakeholders.

6 Donors and implementing partners working in the DRM sphere should strengthen DRM capacity-building training for the political leaders and awareness-raising efforts across line ministries. Political leaders aware of the different phases of DRM and the importance of managing risks over crises could be willing to commit more resources. In this regard, the USAID PYL Activity should consider short-term in-service training for political leaders and provision of DRM fellows to line ministry offices at the sub-national level, in addition to DRM-specific offices.

Policy Element 3: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement

Overall, "Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement" during the DRM policy design process was rated as emergent, progressing to expanding (a total score of 2.65). The federal-level KIs rated it as expanding (a total score of 3.20), while the sub-national level rated it as emergent (see Fig. 11 and 12).



Figure 11: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement by Level of Assessment

Inclusive Participation in the Policy Process (Sub-Element 3.1)

Considering stakeholder categories, the higher maturity rating for this sub-element was given by IPs (a total score of 3.36), followed by DRMC key informants (a total score of 3.33). Oromia region KIs rated the maturity of the DRM policy design coordination process as not yet present (see Fig. 12 and 13).

Invitation for Feedback

Interviewees, especially those working at the federal level and in the Amhara region, identified that one of the most useful mechanisms for inclusive participation has been the government's willingness and the invitation to implementers and beneficiaries to provide feedback on DRM policy work in the forms of technical input, consultations, workshops, and other participatory events (13 excerpts, 11 sources). One respondent shared, "*The policy was designed in a way to involve stakeholders. Even though they didn't implement the activities yet, the stakeholders participate in every activity, they give directions and also participate in training. The stakeholders also have the know-how about implementations. That is why we achieved 60/70% of planned activities; it is because of their participation. These DRM stakeholders participated at woreda, zone, region, and federal level,*" indicating that this early invitation may have cascading impacts on buy-in and follow-through.



Figure 12: Policy Development and Coordination by Region

Successful Engagement of Specific Stakeholder Groups

One of the major targeted groups that the process has been able to reach has been NGOs, especially in task forces specific for each of the three phases of DRM—preparation/prevention, response, and recovery (13 excerpts, 8 sources). Another important group that the process has been able to reach for inclusion has been other government officials who are not working directly on DRM, but rather DRM-related or contributing sectors like the Ministry of Water and Energy, the Ministry of Peace, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Health, subsequent regional bodies, etc. (9 excerpts, 8 sources). This intentional inclusion was strategic to help ensure that there were no technical capacity problems and to create a sense of belonging for implementation. One key informant representing EDRMC stated that they have tried to engage all stakeholders at different levels, such as the top managers and experts from different government offices, the community, different NGOs, and CSOs, such as religious leaders and so forth.

Generally, there has been a lack of inclusivity and stakeholder engagement in the Ethiopia DRM policy development and implementation processes to date (16 excerpts from 15 sources). The opportunities for dialogue are rare. The coordination among DRM stakeholders at the federal (5 excerpts and 5 sources) and regional level (3 excerpts and 3 sources), particularly Amhara (3 excerpts and 3 sources), is also weak. Coordination mainly occurs when there are shocks. For example, a respondent said, "*Leave alone political parties, technical persons do not debate over policy issues and alternatives. The knowledge may exist at an individual level but organization and prioritization of agendas are not a mature process. When you see the 1993 and 2013 policy, there is not much difference in terms of approach and content and this implies that the second was not developed rigorously.*" Moreover, 6 excerpts from 6 sources indicated that not all participating stakeholders were contributing to the design of the policy. During the policy development process, there were invited participants who were busy with their sector routines and did not give much attention to the policy design process; they did not read the draft document, and hence their contributions were minimal.



Figure 13: Policy Development and Coordination by Region

Limited Participation

More specifically, there was limited participation of a number of key DRM actors. There was limited private sector participation in the Ethiopia DRM policy development and implementation (11 excerpts from 11 sources), as highlighted by a key informant, "*there is no participation of private sectors, business owners and individuals engaged in structured and systematic manner. I never witnessed participation of private sectors, maybe because they were not invited by DRM. It is not habitual.*" This limited private sector participation was felt more by regional level participants (8 excerpts from 8 sources), particularly in the Amhara (4 excerpts from four sources) and Somali regions (3 excerpts from 3 sources).

Similarly, CSOs' participation in DRM policy design and development is very low (9 excerpts from 8 sources). Lead sectors' key informants (5 excerpts from 4 sources) from the federal (3 excerpts

excerpts from 3 sources) and Somali region (4 sources from 3 sources) felt that CSOs' participation is very limited. Federal-level key informants also described limited participation of the DRM lead sectors in the DRM policy design and implementation process (4 excerpts from 4 sources). Furthermore, 4 excerpts from 3 sources described limited or no community participation in the DRM policy design process. For example, *"There are some involvements but I don't think really at policy level. I don't think that farmers or individuals are engaged in policy preparation. I don't think the lower level stakeholders have the voice to determine or to be included in the policy. It is part of a wider political issue; it is a matter of involvement."*

Conclusion

Despite the fact that GoE officials extended more invitations for feedback during the most recent DRM policy reform efforts and were able to get attendance from government officials and NGOs for inclusion, by-and-large participation at both the sub-national level and from key DRM actors like the private sector, CSOs, and communities was lacking. Even for those who did attend events and give feedback, the process was insufficient as participants' comments were not always addressed or incorporated into the resulting policy, meaning that having a proverbial "seat at the table" did not guarantee anything shared will be used. Without representation and actionable inclusion from affected groups at the design phase, ensuring that policies are reflective of multiple stakeholders' opinions is much more difficult and less likely. Lack of inclusion from the design phase also threatens existing trust and relationship capital between policymakers and these groups, inhibiting buy-in and willingness for collaboration on behalf of stakeholders in years to come.

The lack of engagement for sub-national representatives is problematic for another reason—there was a missed opportunity to support contextualization. This DRM policy is set at the national level, but few stakeholders from the woreda level and lower were engaged. Some major concerns from the regional and woreda levels regarding how they would implement a non-contextualized policy were not addressed, making it much more difficult and less realistic for implementers to take action as outlined for DRM.

However, those that were invited also had limited engagement and were not always engaged or paying attention throughout the design process. One potential reason cited for this was a lack of understanding of how policy development works, a barrier to inclusion that could have been resolved with proper planning and information sharing. In order to make a change on collective impact issues like DRM, trust, collaboration, and mutually-reinforcing activities working towards a common agenda must be in place; otherwise, we risk continued issues and limited impact across the board. It is up to each stakeholder to contribute their knowledge and perspectives and for policymakers to genuinely review and incorporate those learning in order to make policies more well-rounded.

Accessible Policy Information (Sub-Element 3.2)

Overall, the maturity of accessibility to Ethiopian DRM policy information was rated as emergent. The ratings vary by the level of assessment and stakeholder groups. The rating decreases as we go down to the lower administrative levels, ranging from almost expanding at the federal level to emergent at the regional level and to not yet present at the woreda level. Considering stakeholder groups, this sub-element was rated as expanding by DRMC KIs, and not yet present by DRM lead sectors and private sector actors. Other stakeholders rated it as emergent, progressing to expanding. All KIs across the three regions rated this sub-element as emergent (see Figs 11-13).

Policy Information Accessibility

Based on the level of assessment, accessibility of policy information was observed at the federal

(3 excerpts from 3 sources) and regional (7 excerpts from 7 sources) levels. Policy documents and DRM materials were accessible and shared with stakeholders who were involved in Ethiopian DRM policy design, and data from these sources suggests there were clear sharing mechanisms from the federal to kebele levels in other areas. The DRM policy documents and materials were available in local languages (11 excerpts from 11 sources), and policy materials were also discussed during various meetings and DRM policy sensitization and awareness-creation training/workshops (4 excerpts from 4 sources).

Lack of Clear Communication on DRM Policy Information

Despite the above finding regarding policy information accessibility, a greater subset of the data (24 excerpts from 21) identified that there was no clear communication of accessible DRM policy information. This was because the information was communicated only to limited stakeholders, there was poor communication of the policy content, and generally, there was a lack of available information in a documented form related to DRM. The policy was well-known at the national level but not at the regional level. Some stakeholders were enabled to access the policy drafts from provided websites, but it was not available in an accessible form like a hard-copy or printed form that might help readability and accessibility more broadly. There is not a good culture of accessing and sharing information among most institutions participating in DRM work (34 excerpts from 32 sources). The information about the DRM policy was not disseminated to the grassroots level, particularly from the woreda and kebele levels that include farmers and rural people. Hence, this created a large awareness gap (13 excerpts from 12 sources). One respondent shared, "*I could say that the then-policy information was not accessible to the desired level. Our country's policy most of the time is designated by some group from above. The discussion is held with some experts at the federal and regional levels. So, I believe that the DRM policy has passed through this trend; and can be rated as it is in the emergent status. But had it been stretched to the general public it would have been better.*" Additionally, the available information related to DRM policy was not communicated in the proper local languages for each region, such as Amharic, Somali, Oromifa, etc. Hence, this caused major limitations of communication, particularly at the community level (9 excerpts from 9 sources). As a respondent described, "*I understand there are gaps due to the GoE policy not being multi-lingual. The policy is not translated.*"

Conclusion

Responses on accessible policy information are conflicted. Some respondents indicated that materials were available in their local languages along with the execution of policy socialization efforts, while others directly contradicted this pointing out that there was no clear communication about where DRM policy information could be located, and information was not communicated properly in local languages for each region, creating a major barrier in terms of who could read and review materials and advocate accordingly. While both sets of respondents may be correct based on their vantage points into the system, the evidence regarding information inaccessibility is triple that of accessibility, which is worrisome. In order to get beneficiaries or stakeholders to engage in policy development and abide by new policies once issued, they first must be made aware of what is expected of them and have access to background information to which they can react.

Multi-level, Equitable Stakeholder Participation (Sub-Element 3.3)

This sub-element was generally rated as emergent. The ratings vary by level of assessment, stakeholder groups, and region. It was rated as not yet present at the woreda level, compared to almost expanding at the federal level. Amhara region KIs rated it as emergent, but both Oromia and Somali regional KIs rated it as not yet present. When we see the ratings by stakeholder

groups, DRMC KIs gave relatively better scores (expanding), whereas DRM lead sectors, CSOs, private sector actors, and academia rated it as not yet present. Following in the footsteps of DRMC, donors and IPs gave relatively better ratings for this sub-element— emergent, progressing to expanding.

Equitable Participation

A few respondents asserted that there was equitable participation in the design and implementation of the DRM policy (4 excerpts from 4 sources). For example, one of the key informants representing EDRMC described equitable participation as follows, "*Different issues and groups have been included in the policy framework development process such as cross-cutting issues, environmental issues, vulnerable groups like women's, children's and elders; and climate changes. Even the disaster affects the vulnerable groups, so that serious attention has been given to them. What I fear is the law enforcement and implementation process that needs commitment. Many things are included in the policy framework development process. In this regard, we have better understanding. So that it can be rated as expanding.*"

Selective Participation and Limited Engagement

Regional level key informants (8 excerpts from 7 sources), especially those from the Somali region (6 excerpts from 5 sources) DRMC, described that overall there was limited multi-level equitable participation in DRM policy design and implementation. Respondents highlighted that engagement of stakeholders in DRM policy development is often selective (7 excerpts from 7 sources under the overarching element; 14 excerpts from 10 sources from sub-element 3.3). Participation was more open to donors and NGOs, involving those stakeholders with the potential to contribute resources to the policy design process. One of the key informants from the Somali region described the engagement of the stakeholders this way: "*In terms of inclusivity and stakeholder engagement, the policy is open only to donors and NGOs like WFP and UNICEF in the educational sector.*" The issue of selective participation was raised by federal (3 excerpts from 3 sources) and Somali regional (10 excerpts from 6 sources) lead sectors. Also, there was limited to no marginalized group participation in the design and implementation of the DRM policy (4 excerpts from 4 sources). For example, "*For instance, we do have voiceless segments or members of the community like people with disabilities, women, elders, and poor people living with a deteriorated livelihood. I don't think that the policy has engaged the sayings of these people. Had it engaged these people, the policy's status of multi-level and equitable stakeholder participation would have been in a better condition. The representatives from these segments and other segments from CSOs, political groups, and rural and urban areas should have participated.*"

Poor Engagement at the Sub-National Level

Inadequate levels of stakeholders' engagement at lower levels (e.g., the woreda level) was mentioned by 7 excerpts from 7 sources. Most of the coordination is happening at the higher level, especially at the federal level. The policy was not consulted on or commented on at the lower levels during design. One respondent from woreda said that training is given regarding the policy, but there was no opportunity to discuss it and its challenges. Other respondents from the federal and regional levels agreed that lower-level stakeholders are not engaged nor commented on the policy. Woreda-level stakeholders have no clear understanding of the policy and policy development process. Respondents, particularly at the regional level (4 excerpts and 4 sources), said that woreda-level stakeholders have limited knowledge of the policy. For example, according to a respondent from the Somali region, "*The majority of the DRM policy stakeholders don't know about the policy development process. Let alone about the policy development process, they don't know the policy itself. Lack of awareness is critical at wereda levels. The lack of information-sharing mechanisms resulted in a lack of awareness.*" Additionally, federal (6 excerpts from 6 sources) and regional (3 excerpts from 3 sources) level key informants, particularly those representing the civil society organizations (3 excerpts from 3 sources) and lead sectors (3 excerpts from 3 sources),

described that there is inadequate sub-national level participation in the implementation of the DRM policy.

Depth and Impact of Participation (Sub-Element 3.4)

The depth and impact of participation of stakeholders in the DRM policy design process was generally rated as emergent with an average score of 2.46. The average score clearly varies by level of assessment, stakeholder group, and region. The average score is higher at the federal level (expanding) than at the sub-national level (emergent). While the DRMC KIs rated it as expanding, DRM lead sectors, donors, IPs, and civil society organizations rated it emergent, and private sector actors and academia KIs rated it as not yet present. Oromia region KIs perceived depth and impact of participation as not yet present, and Amhara and Somali regional respondents rate it as emergent (see Fig. 11-13).

Incorporation of Feedback

EDRMC and INGO staff working at the federal level stated that stakeholders have provided their feedback and that their inputs were incorporated into the policy in a timely fashion (15 excerpts and 14 sources). One participant mentioned, "*The policy revising is based on Government article 89/3. It is legally buy-in now and participating all stakeholders and all stakeholders delivered comments we revised based on comments and finalizing now. It incorporates all key practitioners, is legally accepted now, stakeholders' inputs from all actors participated and it is institutional now.*"

Regional-level key informants believe that overall, stakeholders had no significant participation in the DRM policy implementation (5 excerpts from 5 sources), with the exception of NGOs in Somali in particular (5 excerpts from 5 sources). For example, "*I have said that the participation or engagement was just nominal, and the relevant stakeholders didn't engage. With this, I don't think that the ideas and interests of those who participated were fairly considered and incorporated into the final version of the policy document. It seems that the dialogues and consultations were conducted for the sake of fulfilling procedural requirements. In other words, I don't think that their inputs were considered. This in turn has a big gap in bringing a sense of ownership during its implementation.*" Additionally, during the DRM policy design, there were instances where relevant comments and suggestions by the participating stakeholders were rejected or overlooked by the coordinator (4 excerpts from 3 sources).

Conclusion

With many stakeholders left out of the process and policymakers discarding inputs of those who were able to participate, stakeholders are unlikely to own and support the implementation of the DRM policy. This sub-element is not yet present in Ethiopia.

Policy Element 3 Recommendations

1. Lead policymakers (e.g., EDRMC) must incorporate and resource large-scale and inclusive policy information dissemination into both the policy design and policy implementation processes, including translating policy information into local languages AND communicating about where people can learn more if they want to engage further. Reducing as many barriers to entry as possible, including something as simple as having the policy available in multiple languages, is likely to make awareness raising easier and enables better engagement in policy design and improved uptake of policy implementation.

2 Government stakeholders in charge of the policy development process (e.g., DRM policy reform) should leverage lessons learned from this instance where despite their intentions for inclusion, people with various identities did not feel heard or sufficiently involved and there remains an overwhelming perception that inclusivity is problematic. While the design cannot be changed at this juncture, policymakers should identify actions to attempt to bridge the divide and strain caused in these relationships if they are genuinely interested in collaboration and inclusion in the future, in particular with how the policy implementation roll-out is actioned.

3 Policymakers must continue to educate others on how policy development happens so that stakeholders can sufficiently contribute should they be called up for future ideas and feedback. On the same note, beneficiaries must make an honest attempt to learn about policy processes and actively engage when invited to ensure the formulation of representative and meaningful policies.

Policy-Element 4: Evidence-Informed Policy-Making

Policies should be developed using relevant data and evidence to ensure contextually-relevant and actionable policies that are effective and efficient based on existing knowledge of what works and does not work in the relevant sector(s). In this regard, the current assessment identified that overall, the practice of evidence-informed policy-making in the DRM space is emergent, progressing to expand.

In fact, federal-level participants and those from EDRMC, donors, and IPs rated it as expanding; particularly, EDRMC and IPs rated it as expanding, progressing to advanced. The private sector KIs rated it not yet present. All KIs from the regions rated it as emergent.

Evidence Generated in a Timely Manner (Sub-Element 4.1)

Data regularly produced on policy implementation through research and analyses commissioned from credible research institutions that are shared in a timely manner to inform policy decision-making is paramount.

In the current assessment, evidence generated in a timely manner to inform policy decision-making was generally rated as emergent, progressing to expanding. Again, the average maturity rating score significantly varies by level of assessment, stakeholder groups, and region. Federal-level KIs rated this sub-element as expanding, but the sub-national participants rated it as emergent. Considering stakeholder groups, DRMC and IP KIs rated this sub-element as expanding, those representing the academia rated it as not yet present, and all other stakeholders judged the maturity ratings as emergent. Both Oromia and Somali regional KIs rated it not yet present, but those from the Amhara region judged it emergent (see Fig. 14-16).

DRM has multiple sources of data or information on disasters to use for decision-making, such as GoE sector offices, ADP, BRE, UN OCHA, Meteorology, FEWSNET, etc. (11 excerpts and 10 sources), and according to one source, data sharing between and among these offices has improved over time. Though respondents from all federal (5 excerpts and 5 sources), regional (not triangulated -3 excerpts and 2 sources), and woreda (3 excerpts and 3 sources) levels agree in terms of the mechanism of generating evidence, it is only at the federal level that better coordination systems for producing and consolidating evidence exist.

Multiple respondents indicated that DRM-related data is not generated and shared in a timely manner (15 excerpts from 14 sources). Interviewees stated that there are inadequate resources to generate evidence and consistently inform decision-making (9 excerpts and 9 sources). Stakeholders, including research centers, have no adequate resources in terms of budget and trained technical manpower. One participant shared, "*There is no timely generation of data to amend or improve the policy. There is no capacity and resource to generate quality evidence or data.*" At the federal level, these shortages limit the ability of stakeholders to generate high-quality evidence (3 excerpts and 3 sources); Similarly, there are inadequate resources to generate evidence and inform decisions at the regional level (5 excerpts and 5 sources), particularly in Somali Region (4 excerpts and 4 sources). In regards to timeliness, the time it takes to collect data at the kebele and woreda levels, and also the time needed to analyze and share it with stakeholders at the regional and federal levels, has been slow. There are times when collected data may be put on shelves without feeding any information to policy or decision-making. One respondent shared, "*I haven't seen a study that shows prospects of emergencies. I haven't seen*

research that analyzes an emergency and proposes recommendations. Researches are worthless and will be kept on shelves if we don't conduct them timely for the intended users or purpose." A few respondents mentioned that this lack of timely access might be due to coordination issues across regions and institutions (4 excerpts, 4 sources).



Figure 14: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement by Level of Assessment

Conclusion

Timely data is a backbone for all phases of the DRM cycle. However, even though there are multiple DRM-related data sources from different organizations, evidence relevant for DRM decision-making is not yet produced in a timely manner. Reasons for lack of timely evidence include poor coordination, limited resources to conduct DRM-relevant research, poor data utilization practices, and inconsistent data generation methods.

Quality Evidence is Available, Accessible, and Trustworthy for DRM Policy-Making (Sub-Element 4.2)

This sub-element could be fulfilled if, for example, relevant and current evidence is gathered using accepted data gathering methods, data interpretation is transparent and unbiased, and evidence is translated into accessible forms for a variety of audiences. Overall, this sub-element was judged as emergent, progressing to expanding for Ethiopia's DRM policy design and implementation. A relatively better maturity rating score was given by federal-level KIs, and KIs from DRMC and IPs, who all rated this sub-element as expanding. On average, private sector KIs and those KIs from the Somali region judged this sub-element as not yet present (see Fig. 14-16).

Evidence, such as assessment reports, is available from multiple stakeholders, including GoE, INGOs, and UN agencies like UN OCHA (12 excerpts and 12 sources). For example, one respondent

that there is *a periodical and seasonal (Meher and Belg) assessments available to inform some DRM policy*. Quality evidence is also available at the regional level (3 excerpts and 3 sources) but may not be as advanced as that at the federal level. One example of this could be the use of woreda profiles to generate and prioritize agendas properly (3 excerpts, 3 sources). This evidence availability is triangulated at the federal level (8 excerpts and 8 sources), particularly by donors (3 excerpts and 3 sources) and INGOs (3 excerpts and 3 sources). Respondents also indicated that these assessment reports and other pieces of evidence are being shared with stakeholders and the public through radio, written reports, workshops, and seminars (8 excerpts and 7 sources). Sources also indicated that data collection and analysis are done in a scientific way by involving international experts and research institutions for quality assurance (7 excerpts, 7 sources). Evidence is required to be supported with videos, metrological figures, photographs, etc., to enable verification.



Figure 15: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement by Stakeholder Category

Insufficient Evidence for Policy Design

Multiple participants indicated that the evidence used for policy-making is insufficient or has quality assurance issues (16 excerpts and 15 sources). Particularly, issues in terms of not collecting data at the grassroots level and the low participation of lower-level stakeholders are raised as possible indicators of the gap in the evidence generated. One source said that the DRM policy ignores disasters in the cities or towns as a result of insufficient studies and data collected at the lower levels. The policy-making process was focused on the available data from different partners and practitioners as a mainly top-down approach. The issue with insufficient and low-quality data

is triangulated at the federal (3 excerpts and 3 sources) and regional (11 excerpts and 10 sources) levels - particularly in the Somali Region (7 excerpts and 6 sources).

Inaccessibility of Data

A large number of interviewees indicated that there is a challenge in terms of access to DRM-related data since available data are either kept on shelves or shared only with higher officials/selected people (16 excerpts and 14 sources). At the woreda level, risk profiling data are not well-documented and easily accessible. In addition, there is no effective way of transferring data from woreda to regional and federal level stakeholders. The information that is available on the EDRMC website is not up to date. For example, one respondent said, "*In case of episodic disasters events, for example, if you go to woreda and kebeles you can't find any documented data and there is no well-established reporting system in general. At the time of disaster occurrences, you would not find any data.*" Particularly, access to relevant and updated data at the federal (6 excerpts and 6 sources) and regional levels (8 excerpts and 6 sources) is difficult for stakeholders. In the Somali Region, 6 excerpts and 4 sources confirm that the practice of DRM data sharing is weak, and the mechanism or system to collect, document, and share relevant data with stakeholders is an area for improvement.



Figure 16: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement by Stakeholder Category

Untrustworthy Data Quality

Many respondents triangulated that the quality of DRM data is low partially due to inflated and outdated information (15 excerpts and 14 sources). For instance, one interviewee mentioned that "*we often collect rainfall and climate data consequently. But we end up with outdated information and the data we often get is four years old and the like*." The available information is also insufficient, such as the number of people affected by age and sex, disasters, and geographic location are not properly documented. These gaps are more reflected at the federal (7 excerpts and 6 sources) and regional level (6 excerpts and 6 sources), particularly in the Somali Region (4 excerpts and 4 sources). The data lacks nuanced details to support mitigation efforts as forecasts and scenarios are not sufficiently used to inform prospects of disasters (6 excerpts from 6 sources). The adequacy of data greatly varies across types and instances of disasters. For instance, better data is available on drought than flooding and conflict. There is a better trend analysis for drought than any other disaster as it has been a common phenomenon in Ethiopia for decades. The trend analysis for conflict and conflict-induced displacement is, however, very low. Where data is collected, interviewees indicated that the data collection and analysis methods are not consistent and clearly described, which affects the data reliability since there are many gaps in comparability and triangulation (3 excerpts, 3 sources).

Conclusion

While there is some evidence that is available and of good quality, there is limited utilization of evidence relevant for DRM policy-making and implementation due to accessibility issues, poor data quality, and limited budget dedicated to research.

Evidence Regularly Incorporated into Policy Decisions (Sub-Element 4.3)

Overall, the practice of regularly incorporating evidence into policy decisions in the DRM policy design and implementation was rated as emergent. Key informants from the woreda level, private sector actors, academia, and those from the Somali region rated this sub-element as not yet present (see Fig. 12-16).

When asked, multiple interviewees indicated that evidence, such as assessments and international standards, is being regularly used for DRM policy decisions (11 excerpts and 10 sources). For example, one source said, "*evidence is regularly incorporated and used for policy decisions. The reason why it is not institutionalized is because; There is a limitation with regard to using the full capacity. We didn't create any research institute that is equipped with the needed potential as a country. We have not created research institutes that will be used as inputs for our policies.*" Additionally, sources indicated that there has been progress in the policy-making process due to policymakers' considerations of evidence and lessons learned from previous policies and implementation (4 excerpts from 4 sources). One interviewee shared that some indications of this in the current policy include shifts from drought and food-aid focused DRM to a multi-hazard [flood, fire, drought...] and multi-sectoral approach, structurally decentralizing DRM by setting up offices at the woreda level, organizing a DRM committee at the kebele level, and shifting from disaster/crisis management to risk management ahead of disasters.

In support of evidence utilization, DRM stakeholders have been allocating resources and generating evidence by commissioning research (13 excerpts and 12 sources). One respondent indicated that more than five research projects have recently been or are currently being conducted by stakeholders, and recommendations have been or will be used for policy-making. Evidence used includes primary and secondary data such as trends analyses (historical information), risk and vulnerability assessments, sectoral/technical information, experiences of

other countries (e.g., South Africa and Bangladesh), expert views, international standards (e.g., the Sendai Framework), and international and local rules and regulations. The policy-making process is informed with evidence, and this is triangulated at the federal (6 excerpts and 5 sources) and regional (5 excerpts and 5 sources) levels. This is also triangulated across civil society organizations (4 excerpts and 4 sources) and EDRMC (6 excerpts and 5 sources).

Respondents shared that evidence has been generated and used as an input for policy formulation and decision-making, but only intermittently (19 excerpts and 18 sources). Usually, evidence is gathered during policy design, but there is not a culture of collecting and using evidence regularly to update policies and inform decisions unless there is a major emergency. In addition, the use of data to inform decisions from other sources, such as UN agencies, needs improvement. The limitation in using evidence regularly to inform decisions is observed at all levels - federal (8 excerpts and 7 sources), regional (8 excerpts and 7 sources), and woreda (3 excerpts and 3 sources). Among the regions, Amhara and Oromia (3 excerpts and 3 sources each) particularly mentioned the challenge of using evidence in decision-making.

Conclusion

While evidence use in policy-making has improved relatively, there is still significant room for improvement, especially as it pertains to the consistency with which evidence is used to update DRM policies and their implementation. Local evidence, which is very important to contextualizing the international evidence and determining responsive policies, is not regularly utilized for a number of reasons, including lack of timely data, poor quality data, limited resources to gather relevant and timely data, etc.

Capacity to Generate and Use Quality Evidence (Sub-Element 4.4)

The capacity to generate and use quality evidence includes, among others, the government's capacity to monitor and evaluate policies and programs and know when additional evidence may need to be commissioned, stakeholders' knowledge and skills to connect evidence to relevant policy considerations, etc. In this regard, the current assessment indicated that, in general, the capacity to generate and use quality evidence in the DRM space is emergent. Key informants from DRMC rated this sub-element as expanding. Key informants at all levels of assessment and in all regions rated it as emergent. Stakeholders such as private sector actors, civil society organizations, and academia rated this sub-element as not yet present (see Fig. 12-16).

Sources stated that stakeholders' capacities, including the capacity of GoE, to generate evidence and use is increasing (19 excerpts and 16 sources). This includes the availability of qualified local and international experts and increasing engagement of research centers. Regarding capacity to generate evidence, one civil society respondent shared, "*we have established an information center within the disaster prevention office. That information center has a web designer, trainer, GPS specialist and the likes. It has at least seven specialists. Accordingly, there is an information knowledge management center that is commanded by disaster risk management but supported by the UNDP. The intention was to provide a one-stop information center by organizing information that comes from different places, early warning alert messages and meteorological forecasts. It can give information through mapping and in the form of bulletins.*" Regarding evidence use, another respondent said, "*There is a good system of data collections and data elaborations. Sometimes ago it was done by donors but now there is important development at country level at least the federal and regional level data is more advanced and shared timely.*" The improvement in the capacity of stakeholders is reflected at the federal (5 excerpts and 5 sources) and regional levels (9 excerpts and 7 sources), particularly among respondents from EDRMC (3 excerpts and 3 sources) and lead sectors (5 excerpts and 3 sources).

The capacity to generate quality data varies across stakeholders and types of shock (7 excerpts, 6 sources). Relatively, NGOs are mentioned as having better-dedicated resources and manpower than government offices. Stakeholders have a relatively better capacity to generate and use data on droughts than on floods and conflicts due to a lack of experience and less predictability of those types of disasters. This variation of capacities is particularly apparent in the Somali Region (5 excerpts and 3 sources). Once data has been collected, it is not being properly stored, analyzed, and shared with stakeholders (5 excerpts and 4 sources). The lack of usage of technology (e.g., software) limits the ability of stakeholders to use data and manage knowledge. Network/connectivity is also mentioned as a challenge in collecting meteorology data from woredas. Respondents claimed that resource constraints limited the capacity of stakeholders to generate and use data (23 excerpts from 22 sources). These resource limitations are mainly related to manpower (both regarding the technical capacity of staff and having a sufficient number of staff), shortages of budget, lack of technology, insufficient experience in specific types of disasters, lack of capacity in report writing, lack of commitment, frequent restructuring, inconsistent priority given to EDRMC, and very few academic institutions involved in the DRM space. To illustrate this, one interviewee mentioned, "*At the time of policy development, the government reduced employees of DRM from 900 to 300 claiming we should discourage aid dependence because they used to believe that DRM works on aid distribution. It was the time of BPR that created organizational shock.*" Resource limitations to generate evidence are most felt at the federal (7 excerpts and 7 sources) and regional (13 excerpts and 12 sources) levels in government offices (5 excerpts and 4 sources), particularly in the Somali Region (4 excerpts and 3 sources).

Conclusion

It is important for all DRM stakeholders to have the knowledge and skills to connect evidence to relevant policy considerations. DRM stakeholders' capacities, including the capacity of the GoE, to generate and use evidence in the policy space are increasing. This promising improvement could be due to the availability of local universities with DRM departments and increasing engagement of qualified international experts in NGOs with local staff and partners. However, there are also a number of challenges negatively influencing the capacity to generate and use quality evidence, primarily a lack of resources, both in terms of staff and funding for necessary evidence.

Policy Element 4 Recommendations

1. EDRMC, together with other DRM stakeholders (particularly local universities and other knowledge institutions, donors, and implementing partners), should standardize DRM-related evidence standards to ensure comparability over time and across different sources. This will help to improve the consistency, quality, and utility of data generated by different stakeholders and at different times. Standardization also includes when and how often to collect specific types of data. To put these new standards into action, EDRMC should also strengthen its resource mobilization strategies to finance relevant research activities in support of evidence-informed policies.

2. The USAID/SDRM-SI project should strengthen EDRMC's and other DRM stakeholders' adaptive management capacity through its DRM-CB, SDRM-SI DE, and other complementary Activities. In a similar vein, USAID/SDRM-SI project should leverage its PYL Activity to encourage and strengthen local universities to produce quality data and integrate evidence-driven decision-making into the DRM curriculum for fellows. Moreover, the Mission should encourage its implementing partners to implement any research activities with government counterparts so as to intentionally transfer research, data management, and utilization skills.

Policy-Element 5: Policy Implementation

All KIs at all levels of assessment and in all regions except the private sector actors rated implementation of the DRM policy as emergent (see Fig. 17-19); the private sector actors rated the DRM policy as expanding.

Regional-level key informants in the Somali region, especially those representing lead sectors, highlighted that exposure to emergency response activities improved DRM policy implementation by strengthening coordination and collaboration, resource mobilization efforts, and by enhancing transparent policy implementation (6 excerpts from 4 sources).

Poor organizational structure hindered the DRM policy implementation (9 excerpts from 9 sources), particularly in Amhara (6 excerpts from 6 sources). Aside from the organizational structure, key informants indicated that lack of awareness about the DRM policy documents poses challenges in implementing the DRM policy (7 excerpts from 7 sources). For example, "Generally speaking, the DRM policy implementation process is at the emergent stage because efforts have been made to implement the policy, however, all stakeholders might not implement it with clear understanding and awareness as per the policy." Lastly, sources indicated that the policy was not properly implemented due to a lack of decentralization of required resources (4 excerpts from 4 sources).

Implementation Plans Developed (Sub-Element 5.1)

Similarly, all KIs at all levels of assessment and in all regions, including DRMC, rated implementation of the DRM policy as emergent (see Fig. 17-19).

The Ethiopian DRM policy developed a multi-year, multi-sector plan for better DRM implementation, including a prioritized agenda developed by the government and stakeholders; the developed plan prioritized objectives and guiding principles and contained both physical and financial details, which were shared with implementers for the intervention process (36 excerpts from 33 sources).

There was a practice of making plan preparations institutional (4 excerpts from 4 sources). As respondents explained, "*It could be said that the plan is institutionalized since stakeholders at the woreda level come together, assess the existing scenario, and plan what they have to do.*" Additionally, as the level of assessment indicates, developing implementation plans has worked well at the federal level (7 excerpts from 7 sources), regional level for Amhara and Somali (18 excerpts from 16 sources), and the woreda (11 excerpts from 10 sources) levels.

Roles and Responsibilities Indicated in the Implementation Plan

Respondents highlighted that the developed implementation plan was inclusive of outlining the roles and responsibilities of each participant and stakeholder involved in the implementation as guidance (7 excerpts from 7 sources). The DRM committee prepared checklists with some of this information and monitored if the roles and responsibilities were implemented.

Where a plan was prepared for the implementation of the Ethiopian DRM policy framework and guideline, some respondents felt the plan was neither multi-sectoral nor inclusive of multiple years as the plans of different actors and sectors are not integrated or considerate of different types of shocks (9 excerpts from 8 sources). For instance, one respondent said, "*The woreda DRM office doesn't have plans. Quarterly early warning plans are exception. The office collects and*

documents sectoral plans: livestock, health, water, etc. plans. But, this is not multi-sector plan prepared by multi-stakeholder ownership. There is no formal CSOs and private sector involvement." The perceived limitation of not having a multi-sectoral plan was mainly mentioned as problematic for the Somali regions (8 excerpts from 7 sources), particularly in lead sectors (5 excerpts from 4 sources).

Additionally, many stakeholders have not developed a proactive DRM implementation plan that includes physical and financial details due to budget constraints, incapability to prepare the plan, lack of supervision, inadequate monitoring, and a lack of implementers integrating the DRM policy into their work at various levels (12 excerpts from 12 sources). For instance, one respondent explained this as, "*I believe the policy implementation plan was not done. For instance, UNICEF has a project named 'Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan' that is done annually but EDRMC does not participate in the planning process for the reason I do not know. Experts from regional DRM participate for the sake of getting per deim but they do not implement the plan.*" These plan limitation challenges were raised frequently from the federal (4 excerpts) and regional (7 excerpts) level KIIs, particularly in Amhara and Somali Regions from INGOs (3 excerpts) and lead sector (5 excerpts) stakeholder groups.



Figure 17: DRM Policy Implementation by Level of Assessment

Conclusion

While there is a multi-sectoral multi-year DRM plan to implement the existing DRM policy, some

stakeholders feel it is not representative or inclusive of all necessary DRM actors and regional considerations. There have been improvements in the generation of the most recent plan, including providing details of various roles and responsibilities, but the lack of inclusion of adequate physical and financial details, as well as an implementation monitoring plan, still hinders action on the developed plan(s).

Implementation Capacity (Sub-Element 5.2)

All KIs at all levels of assessment and in all regions except the private sector actors rated implementation of the DRM policy as emergent; for this sub-element, the private sector actors rated it as not yet present (see Fig. 17-19).

Respondents, especially Lead Sector Representatives and EDRMC Representatives, indicated that DRM Policy Implementation Capacity generally exists within Ethiopia across the regional and federal levels within the DRM Bureaus and representative sectors (18 excerpts, 18 sources). Though not individually triangulated, respondents point out that the creation of new structures, the expansion of DRM activities, and the hiring of skilled workers have helped towards improvement. Various stakeholder groups, including EDRMC representatives, IPs, CSOs, and donors, indicated that one of the practices helping to improve implementation capacity is collaborative implementation, where experts can be engaged to support implementation and response through GoE-NGO partnerships (4 excerpts, 4 sources). Not only do NGOs bring expertise, but they also come with resources and financing, perhaps most importantly, their own capable staff that could be seconded for surge support or training.

Regional Capacity Strengthened

Among these reflections, Lead Sector Representatives were quick to point out that capacity is notable, especially at the regional level, as experts have bolstered DRM response (5 excerpts, 4 sources). One informant shared, "*The implementation capacity of the region is getting advanced because the regional bureaus are providing educational opportunities to their workers especially in the DRM and sustainable development program offered in Jijiga and Bahir Dar Universities and this chance has capacitated the working force in the disaster related issues happening in the region.*" In addition to the supplemental training available, one key capacity mentioned among Lead Sector Representatives was that regional experts are particularly strong at writing proposals and securing funds for their needed interventions.

Many interviewees stated that there is poor DRM technical capacity that hinders the implementation of the DRM policy in Ethiopia (30 excerpts from 25 sources). While many respondents mentioned a general lack of DRM knowledge, others specified issues, including a lack of writing skills for proposals and regular reporting, a lack of leadership experience in DRM, a lack of training to increase awareness, and a lack of planning skills. For example, "The stakeholders endowed with the task of implementing policy decisions are not well-equipped with the required knowledge, skills, and experiences. Thus, in addition to the need for short-term capacity-building training, Degree and Master's level training on the issues of DRM is deemed necessary. More particularly, the training opportunity should be given to at least the woreda level DRM office workers so that they professionally lead the DRM activities. A gap in capacity exists in all the implementing agencies or stakeholders." This was particularly notable at the national and sub-national levels for EDRMC and GoE officials (6 excerpts from 6 sources, and 8 excerpts from 8 sources, respectively). On top of the lack of capacity, high staff turnover also challenges the implementation capacity for DRM policy (11 excerpts from 10 sources). For example, one of the key informants shared, *"The implementation capacity is largely overwhelmed by high employee turnover. Adaptive management skills of the implementers could be considered loose. Even the employee turnover has negatively impacted the implementation capacity of the institutions."*

Conclusion

Having the right implementation capacity is important to ensure that the intended program is implemented with sufficient quality to produce the outcome aimed to achieve. When assessing implementation capacity, there are different types of capacities to consider, namely, staff capacity, leadership capacity, technical capacity, fiscal capacity, and partnership/collaboration capacity. In this regard, from the current assessment, we concluded that in Ethiopia, there exists some general implementation capacity to implement the DRM policy. However, the existing general implementation capacity is because of the support and capacity-building interventions provided by donors and non-governmental organizations. NGOs bring expertise, resources and financing, and most importantly, their own capable staff that could be seconded for surge support or training. Otherwise, the government has limitations in almost all types of implementation capacities, including staff, technical, leadership, fiscal, and partnership capacities.

Poor staff capacity is mainly due to high-skilled staff turnover and limited capacity-building trainings provided to staff. High staff turnover and lack of capacity-building interventions for local staff affect the sustainability of the DRM policy implementation effort.

DRM being a multi-hazard and multi-stakeholder activity, leadership, partnership/collaboration capacity is critical for DRM mainstreaming and implementing the policy. Various stakeholder groups indicated that one of the practices helping to improve implementation capacity is collaborative implementation, where experts can be engaged to support implementation and response through GoE-NGO partnerships. However, this leadership and coordination capacity, important prerequisites to facilitate collaboration, is lacking.

There are many significant challenges threatening successful policy development and implementation, and each will require a concerted effort over time to change. With inadequate budget allocation being the biggest inhibitor at the moment, we are unlikely to have a full understanding of the issues since this functions as a dam blocking the way for policy implementation. If there is no dedicated funding for disaster planning and preparedness, then the plan cannot be executed as envisioned, causing further cascading problems.

If there are not an adequate number of technical staff at the regional and woreda level DRM offices with knowledge of the DRM policy, implementation will necessarily be lacking because those staff members are supposed to coordinate and provide direction to other implementers. This lack of capacity certainly contributes to other inhibitors on this list (poor organizational structure, lack of ownership, poor communication) because those within the leading bureau are not resourced well enough with technical staff to provide support to those structures that highlight what ownership and strong communication look like. This issue could be related to high staff turnover as those with existing capacity are departing because NGOs and donors are offering better pay. When those staff depart, issues of handover and sustainability kick in as there are questionable/non-existent knowledge management processes in place to retain what progress has been made. Policy implementation progress cannot be made if those responsible for helping are constantly exiting for better opportunities and without managing the knowledge gained appropriately.

The current organizational structure, as interviewees described, is overly dependent on committees and staff from the various offices (e.g., the Office of Agriculture) who are already juggling many tasks. This approach to the integration of DRM work could be strong, but without capacitated staff with room to work on these issues, it currently means that implementation is sometimes deprioritized compared to other projects. Additionally, leaders must be aware that because DRM is lumped with food security, multiple sectors try to claim ownership because food security is well-resourced by donors, further complicating issues of organization structure and coordination, requiring a better system of accountability (see finding above).



Figure 18: DRM Policy Implementation by Region

Policy Implementation Resources Committed by the Host Country (Sub-Element 5.3)

This sub-element refers to resources committed by the government to implement the identified policy agenda; for example, if over time, the country's budget is adjusted to provide adequate financing for the implementation of actions required to implement the DRM policy priorities. Whether, budget documents, including budget proposals, are released fully and in a timely manner, etc. In this regard, all KIs at all levels of assessment and in all regions, including DRMC, rated this sub-element as emergent (see Fig. 17-19).

Some participants felt there was a sufficient budget available from the Government of Ethiopia for DRM policy agenda implementation (8 excerpts from 8 sources). One example of a step in the right direction is the DRM Contingency Fund.

Many sources triangulated that despite there being a formal DRM policy, there has either been no or insufficient dedicated budget from GoE at the federal and regional levels limiting their abilities to respond when shocks occur (118 excerpts, 78 sources). As indicated by one respondent, "*There is no budget and many of the activities are done with the budget donated by partners. The government has been injecting some amount of budget but it is not focused on the issue seriously." Another respondent shared, "The main challenge of DRM is there is no allocated annual budget by Finance.*" As there was not sufficient dedicated GoE budget for most DRM planned activities, the implementation process has been dependent on others' resource availability like donors and aid agencies' budgets (27 excerpts from 25 sources). Such resource dependency is serious at the federal (5 excerpts from 5 sources) and regional (9 excerpts from 8 sources) levels, particularly in Amhara (5 excerpts from 4 sources).

Lack of Transparency, Fraud, and Reprioritization/Mismanagement

Resource mobilization and utilization in the DRM space are not often transparent (8 excerpts from 7 sources). This lack of transparency around resource mobilization and utilization was particularly reported by DRMC representative key informants from woredas in the Amhara region. Respondents also mentioned issues of fraud and corruption related to humanitarian aid distribution in the country affecting DRM implementation (6 excerpts from 5 sources). Relatedly, in instances where funding has been allocated, there have been issues of financial mismanagement and reprioritization after allocation (3 excerpts, 3 sources). One participant mentioned, "*There are two types of problems in terms of budget. First, the budget allocated is not sufficient because the problems are many and many people are affected. Second, the is transparency problem where the allocated budget is not used to meet the intended target. For instance, a budget is allocated to buy logistics but directed for other purposes. Moreover, we cannot additional budget when we need.*"

Conclusion

Generally, there is very limited budget available for implementation of the DRM policy, and poor budget management, including fraud and corruption, exacerbates the budget limitation problem. The budget allocated for DRM activities from the government side is negligible; the policy implementation is heavily dependent on external funding.

Transparent Policy Implementation (Sub-Element 5.4)

Similarly, all KIs at all levels of assessment and in all regions, including DRMC, rated transparent DRM policy implementation as emergent, progressing to expanding (see Fig. 17-19).

Having a documentation process present has helped to increase transparency and build trust among DRM implementers, especially among respondents in the Amhara region (4 excerpts, 4 sources). Despite this progress, according to respondents, predominantly those at the regional level, there have been many issues regarding policy implementation transparency (44 excerpts, 41 sources). Several sources cited a general weakness in this area (7 excerpts, 7 sources), but others were able to cite more specific issues, including inconsistent/no information sharing, a lack of understanding among implementers of roles and responsibilities, a lack of recourse for feedback or accountability with transparency, and more general instances of fraud in DRM.

The inconsistency or lack of information sharing among DRM policy implementers inhibits transparency (and coordination challenges) as actors are not sharing what they know from monitoring data or analysis (30 excerpts, 28 sources). As illustrated by one participant, "*[Policy Implementation Transparency] is emergent because, neither monitoring data and nor analysis of policy implementation results are shared with stakeholders. Each sector has its own information, not that of the other sector.*" Additionally, even if information was shared, many respondents pointed out the lack of feedback or recourse to hold others accountable as a corrective action (8 excerpts, 8 sources). One respondent pointed out, "*there is a culture of leaving a budget issue to heads of the concerned offices. I felt shy and refrained from asking about details of the mentioned budget. The flow of the budget is not made public. Let alone making it public, the relevant finance officer who asked for clarification about it is told to keep calm and as it is none of his business. The issue of budget usually goes to the heads and focal persons (if there are any). At the time a focal person is assigned for some specific intervention, they also let him/her know budget details since all things are passed through him/her. These specific interventions are projects from IFAD, SLM, GSM, and another project who came to use last year and is concerned with risk minimization. These projects are controlled by heads and the respective focal persons. They don't disclose to experts who engage in the actual task. Unfortunately, institutions that brought these projects only want to see 'minutes' on the progress of the activities, and participants of the meetings are heads of the offices and focal persons.*"

While information sharing and avenues for feedback are important, there are some larger problems at play. Although not directly related to the IAA's definition of policy implementation transparency, multiple respondents cited that there have been instances of fraud or corruption related to DRM. For example, "*From the view of beneficiaries, based on their complains, there are a number of transparency problems reported by beneficiaries. Structurally, I do not have validated data/information about the complaint. You hear people saying 'we did not get what is allocated for us. We have problems of these and that.' Therefore, it looks there are transparency problems.*" Additionally, when policy implementers do not understand that being forthcoming and sharing both successes and weaknesses is part of their role and responsibility, then they are unlikely to share this kind of information (3 excerpts from 3 sources). One interviewee reflected, "*Lack of transparency is so prevalent...The DRMC should explicitly tell what is expected from whom. Last time, we identified businesses and business people who are affected by the recent war and COVID-19 but it was a one-time task. We didn't know what to do then. Overall, it could be said that there is a problem with transparency. The stakeholders don't well aware of the activities and the activities don't communicate. Thus, there should be clear know-how of the roles and responsibilities of the relevant stakeholders.*"

When it comes to the evidence-informed adaptations component of policy implementation, respondents indicated that there are limitations in utilizing the prepared implementation plans due to technical capacity barriers, resource shortages, etc. After all of the efforts for preparation, the DRM Policy often moved to the shelf without being implemented initially, let alone implementing adaptations (4 excerpts from 4 sources). One source stated, "*If you are at the Woreda level, there are Woreda based risk profile, adaptation and mitigation plan etc. but these are kept on the shelf. So far, Woreda based risk profile is prepared for more than 500 Woredas. So, even if these plans are available, it is not utilized to shape their annual, semi-annual, quarterly plan. What I recommend is to update these available plans and incorporate into sectors respective plan for proper implementation.*"



Figure 19: DRM Policy Implementation by Stakeholder Groups

Conclusion

Transparency of policy implementation is important for several reasons. It is important for establishing expectations, building trust with stakeholders and beneficiaries, increasing focus, creating collaboration with different stakeholders, and increasing beneficiaries' satisfaction. Being a multi-sectoral activity, transparency of implementation is crucial in the DRM space. From the current assessment, we conclude that generally, there is limited transparency of the DRM policy in Ethiopia. Transparency is lacking to the extent internal staff is sometimes blind to what is being done in implementing the policy. Poor coordination and communication among stakeholders, poor M&E system, corruption, and fraudulent activities affect the transparency of the DRM policy. The lack of transparent resource mobilization and utilization practices exposes fraudulent activities.

On the other hand, it is concluded that having a documentation process has helped to increase transparency. Though which kind of information is transparently shared is not indicated, the current assessment also showed that at all levels of the assessment, there is transparency in information sharing among different stakeholders.

Monitoring and Evaluation Design and Implementation (Sub-Element 5.5)

Apart from donors and private sector actors, all KIs at all levels of assessment and in all regions, including DRMC, rated Monitoring and Evaluation Design and Implementation as emergent, progressing to expanding. While donors rated it as not yet present, the private sector rated this sub-element as expanding (see Fig. 17-19).

M&E Implementation

Sources indicated that various DRM stakeholders are implementing their M&E plans through activities being conducted jointly by multi-disciplinary teams despite challenges with resourcing and that there are more M&E activities when disasters occur than during non-emergency periods (25 excerpts and 25 sources). Monitoring activities are carried out throughout implementation, such as targeting/distribution and feedback being shared for learning among active stakeholders like UNOHCA, EDRMC, and FAO. Other instances of M&E implementation include the early warning system being used as a monitoring tool, drought monitoring with indicators such as higher inflation of crops and deflation of livestock prices, review meetings, and consultations, including Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) meetings to collect and analyze data, and more. There are structures established to ensure the flow of information from kebele-level stakeholders to federal-level stakeholders as M&E findings are reported among relevant stakeholders (14 excerpts, 14 sources). For instance, a woreda provides reports to zones, and zonal committees evaluate woreda performances. One respondent mentioned, "*We conduct monitoring and evaluation in a coordinated way. We monitor together with other sectors. We follow various approaches of monitoring and evaluation.*"

Well-designed M&E systems

Success in implementation is likely partially attributed to the M&E system/process setup. Respondents across stakeholder groups stated that EDRMC and DRM stakeholders, particularly those in Amhara and Somali, have a well-designed M&E system aligned with international standards and inclusive of well-defined outputs and outcomes with indicators (16 excerpts and 16 sources). For instance, one respondent said, "*government and non-governmental organizations pool their resources and finances together to implement the jointly prepared action plans and evaluate its implementation. Monitoring and evaluation are a part of the plan and there are donors that take the role to evaluate the implementation and that donor allocates budget for it. DRM itself evaluates the implementation of the process.*"

No Implementation

Despite the fact that some groups are doing M&E well, representatives from six different stakeholder groups shared that M&E is either not being implemented regularly or being implemented very poorly among others in ongoing DRM work (23 excerpts, 21 sources). This is due to a number of issues included in more detail below, including insufficient planning, lack of integration into ongoing systems, a focus on emergency response, lack of funding budgeted, and a lack of capacity. One interviewee shared, "*Normally, whenever aid organizations come to the region, they first touch DRM of the region. For instance, if USAID or Amhara Rehabilitation Institute is interested in supporting people in need in the region, it implements it through the DRM bureau. They sign contracts. However, monitoring and supervising the implementation is not organized and visible. They discuss how to implement the programs they come with DRM but strict follow up of the implementation is not habitual.*"

No Integration

Stakeholders focusing on the regional and woreda levels cited that M&E practices have not been integrated recurrently into existing activities, or if it has, it is very weak and inconsistent (24 excerpts, 23 sources). One participant stated, "*Our activity of monitoring and evaluation lags many steps. It has a limitation because most of the time it is being conducted at a time a certain problem has happened. It's not strategically guided via incorporation within a holistic plan. We, the stakeholders, just come to gather for monitoring and evaluation during an emergency by establishing a technical committee.*" Without regular, intentionally integrated M&E systems, stakeholders will always be starting from scratch when an emergency response needs to happen instead of just being able to activate something already integrated into the activity as a whole. Interviewees also identified that although M&E does not cover all geographic areas evenly, some regions and zones are doing worse than others illustrating inconsistency even where gains have been made (4 excerpts, 4 sources).

No MEL System

Regardless of whether they were implementing in Oromia, Amhara, Somali, or at the federal level, interviewees shared that there is no structured and standardized M&E system within DRM to help make practices uniform across the many implementers and stakeholders (23 excerpts, 22 sources). They thought that having a consistent set of practices or guidelines could be used to instill a sense of clarity and ownership for who is responsible for what so that they could be held accountable.

Lack of Capacity

IPs and the Lead Sector representatives led the pack in indicating that they lack the capacity and experience at all levels to do good M&E (13 excerpts, 12 sources). The shortage of skilled DRM M&E manpower has contributed to improper reporting, lack of proper planning, and insufficient coordination among actors, as staff are often under-resourced to meet these needs.

Focus on Response, not MEL Supervision

Participants primarily from the Lead Sector identified that another main issue with DRM M&E is that much of the DRM implementation work focuses on disaster response and delivering basic human needs entirely instead of organizations also dedicating time and resources to MEL supervision (11 excerpts, 10 sources). Part of this is due to the lack of a centralized M&E system or an approach not holding implementers accountable to show what their work is contributing to from insufficient planning. As one respondent put it, there is no central M&E system in place, so naturally, there is no other work other than planning and responding when emergencies occur.

No M&E Budget

Participants at the regional and woreda levels highlighted that for the M&E activities that do exist, there is poor funding or no budget altogether (8 excerpts, 8 sources). This lack of funding inhibits monitoring and evaluation from being implemented as staff cannot access more training and education or travel to conduct site visits for these purposes.

Consequences of No M&E

Representatives from different stakeholder groups shared that as a result of not regularly implementing monitoring and evaluation practices, there have been several disputes about improper use of resources by officials, rumors of beneficiaries not getting aid, insufficient distribution for full coverage of those in need, and overall inhibiting effects on the implementation of DRM activities (4 excerpts, 3 sources).

Conclusions

Policies and strategies need to be supported by a comprehensive M&E Framework which can be used to assess progress made and achievements of results. However, from the current assessment, we conclude that, in general, the existing DRM policy is not adequately supported by an M&E framework; there is no structured and standardized M&E system within DRM to help make practices uniform across the many implementers and stakeholders. Even though both the DRM Policy and Investment Framework (DRM-SPIF) provided a summary description of the M&E Framework envisaged and a logframe, the M&E Frameworks of the DRM Policy and DRM-SPIF are inadequate to track the implementation of the DRM Policy and Strategy. The jointly-funded FCDO and USAID project DRM-CB/BRE-TA recently developed an M&E framework for the DRM policy ratified in 2013.

Several challenges hinder the design and implementation of DRM MEL system, including budget limitation, understaffed office, lack of commitment by focusing on emergency responses and not on MEL, physical inaccessibility, and geographical variation; M&E does not cover all geographic areas evenly, some regions and zones are doing worse than others illustrating inconsistency even where gains have been made.

Policy Element 5 Recommendations

1. EDRMC should advocate with the Ministry of Finance to secure a budget reasonably adequate to implement the DRM policy. Moreover, EDRMC should strengthen its resource mobilization strategies and platforms to sustainably mobilize adequate resources for the DRM policy implementation. Mobilization of the resources should be accompanied by an effective resource management strategy. The USAID/SDRM-SI Project, through its DRM-CB Activity, should continue to support EDRMC to strengthen its resource mobilization and efficient resource management capacity. In the interim, it is imperative that donors and partners continue to allocate funds to support disaster response and enhance the DRM policy implementation.

2. Policy designers and government officials must begin integrating a budget into each and every disaster plan with allocated funds that can be activated for preparedness and response. This will necessarily require a review of existing budgets and reallocation accordingly, as continuing to leave DRM policy with no funds for implementation will hold up progress in this critical area.

3. All DRM stakeholders, including GoE, donors, NGOs, and other stakeholders, should make sure their DRM-related intervention/activities are transparent. One can ensure

transparent implementation by clearly indicating the outline of workflows, explaining the need for transparency to DRM stakeholders and staff, establishing individual roles and responsibilities, explaining changes, strengthening existing collaboration platforms, including regular meetings and information sharing among stakeholders, and ensuring accountabilities.

4 EDRMC should work with donors and those with strong coordinating power to re-examine and continue to strengthen coordination, M&E, and accountability mechanisms for DRM policy implementation. While outside actors have little control over how GoE offices are structured, they can help to smooth the gap in coordination among those working on DRM and DRM-adjacent issues.

5 Government leaders must address issues contributing to turnover, including staff pay, benefits, and training offerings, to improve and implement a retention strategy. Workers are going to continue to follow where they can get the best offer that matches their career goals, and if public service work is not competitive, then issues of high staff turnover will continue.

Policy-Element 6: Mutual Accountability

In the policy design and implementation process, it is expected that government and policy stakeholders co-implement the policy design processes and policy implementation, responsive and supportive of each other's roles and responsibilities concerned with policymaking. In the current assessment, mutual accountability in DRM policy design and implementation was generally rated as emergent (see Fig. 2). The mutual accountability was rated emergent at all levels of the assessment and by each participating region. Considering the stakeholder groups, donors, private sector actors, and academia rated it not yet present, but others like EDRMC, lead sectors, and IPs rated it emergent (see Fig. 20-22).

Good Mutual Accountability

Respondents indicated that there has been some mutual accountability between the government and stakeholders to implement the Ethiopian DRM policy agenda as they have co-implemented and used a cooperative mechanism for agenda execution. Parties have executed and evaluated the activities together during emergency times, exchanging information and data, and sharing resources among stakeholders during shortages (13 excerpts from 12 sources). For instance, at a time of a budget shortage, one KII respondent explains, "*At a time when the lack of budget encountered for certain stakeholders, others borrow from them. As an indicator, if there was a shortage of seeds encountered at the agricultural office, we brought funds from the health sector; and if the health budget encountered problems, we brought from the office of women and children. We brought budgets from others as well.*" There are bright spots where disaster response has been done in close coordination and collaboration among UN agencies and other stakeholders with roles and responsibilities (4 excerpts from 4 sources).

Other respondents indicated that overall, the government and other stakeholders have not designed and implemented DRM policy with mutual accountability as there was a lack of collaboration accountability among them, which could have helped actors to achieve the common goal (29 excerpts from 28 sources). One reason for this was that stakeholders did not know their roles and responsibilities and what was expected of them because those were not stated properly in the policy document (10 excerpts from 10 sources). Respondents also thought that collaborative and mutual accountability is not practical even if it is written in a policy document because there is little formal guidance for enforcement (6 excerpts from 6 sources). Additionally, the stakeholders did not consider DRM activity as their main implementing activity, and instead, they thought it was the duty of implementers; in other words, they just wanted to implement independently rather than taking shared responsibilities among others (6 excerpts from 5 sources). Without an advanced monitoring and evaluation process in the system that could gauge the responsiveness of each party for their role and responsibility of assigned activity, there has been no way to manage and hold each actor accountable. Such lack of collaborative and mutual accountability was observed at the federal level (6 excerpts from 3 sources) and the regional level in Amhara (9 excerpts from 9 sources), Oromia (5 excerpts from 4 sources), and Somali (3 excerpts from 3 sources).

Conclusion

As defined in the IAA framework, mutual accountability is about government actors and policy stakeholders implementing both the policy process (how things get formulated) and policy implementation (how these are then actively applied) in a responsive and supportive way with regard to each other's roles and responsibilities in policy-making. Based on how respondents answered, they have been entirely focused on the implementation phase instead of both implementation and the preceding policy process.

As indicated above in Policy Sub-Element 3.1, there are major overarching issues around the lack of inclusion of stakeholders in the policy process, inhibiting participation and stakeholder buy-in for implementation. Though not mentioned explicitly, it is unlikely that these stakeholders have a clear sense or way to hold policymakers accountable for the policy process other than the formal election cycle or organizational insubordination (which is risky as the government holds power asymmetrically and dictates access to various resources).

While coordination, collaboration, and complementation have been present at times in emergency and DRM policy implementation/response, this has been wholly inconsistent as a result of a lack of stakeholders' awareness of what is expected of them and little monitoring and enforcement to hold each other accountable. It is important to note that there are a number of sequential issues here—when there is no leadership or mutual ownership in setting out right-sized expectations, an effective backbone to support supporting coordination, and a process to monitor and evaluate responses to give feedback and fill gaps, then it is unlikely for accountability to truly be present. When actors are not held accountable, it is likely that we won't be able to learn and will continue to run into repeated problems of inefficient DRM response, ultimately risking more lives and livelihoods than necessary.



Figure 20: Mutual Accountability by Level of Assessment

Government Accountability (Sub-Element 6.1)

The Government is expected to be responsive enough to stakeholder questions and concerns regarding the policy process and implementation, host joint stakeholder reviews, and adaptively manage policy development and implementation. However, the current assessment showed that overall, this policy element was rated as emergent (see Fig. 2), and except for the private sector actors, all KIs at all levels of assessment and by different stakeholders rated maturity of the government accountability as emergent; the private sector actors rated it as not yet present (see Fig. 20-22).

Some interviewees shared that GoE has been accountable for its role and responsibility in Ethiopian DRM policy implementation as it provided necessary resources which were important to the implementation of the policy, such as technical support, shared information and reports to the stakeholders transparently, saved lives and properties of the communities from disasters, and provided direction for the stakeholders their intervention process on DRM (24 excerpts from 22 sources). As one respondent explained, "*Whether it is pre-disaster, during disaster and post-disaster, it is to save lives. In this regard, attempts from government responsibility should be appreciated.*" Regarding engagement with stakeholders, respondents indicated that the government has prepared joint stakeholder engagement reviews for Ethiopian DRM policy implementation to establish discussion forums, provided feedback to concerned bodies, invited stakeholders to review DRM policy design, and incorporated some stakeholders' ideas into policy improvement and implementation (6 excerpts from 6 sources). As one KII respondent explains, "*Yes, they are responsive. It is the government, DRM, that takes the initiative to establish a forum. It is the government who identifies the problems and invites the stakeholder for intervention. It is the government who gives directions for other stakeholders to intervene. It is the government who provides a list of beneficiaries for us.* "

Lack of Responsiveness

Some concerned government sector offices and bodies had a lack of responsiveness and accountability to stakeholders' concerns and questions regarding the Ethiopian DRM policy process and implementation, indicated by poor follow-up and no enforcement system (45 excerpts from 42 sources). If there was accountability in the management of policy implementation, it was sector-based (13 excerpts from 13 sources). One source mentioned, "*There is no mutual accountability. Every sector is accountable for what it plans and does with its budget.*" The lack of mutual accountability affected the roles and responsibilities of all involved parties in the implementation processes, particularly from the government side (8 excerpts from 8 sources), and was observed predominantly at the regional (30 excerpts from 28 sources) level.

Limited Joint Review

Regarding the joint stakeholder policy review component of this sub-element, the government conducted limited joint sessions for policy design with respective stakeholders (23 excerpts from 23 sources). One respondent explained, "*Coordinating the DRM activities in a way that fosters mutual accountability is given to the government. But because of various reasons, mainly from lack of budget, it doesn't undertake joint stakeholder reviews, proper monitoring, and evaluations. There are only some start-ups.*" One of the major inhibitors was that the government did not ensure access to relevant information to the stakeholders or carry out its responsibility to create access to information for the implementation of the Ethiopian DRM policy (3 excerpts from 3 sources). For the stakeholders that are able to contribute their input, interviewees indicated that the government often did not incorporate their ideas or issues (3 excerpts, 3 sources).

No Adaptive Management

Interviewees identified that there is currently no adaptive management in Ethiopian DRM policy

implementation based on monitoring and evaluation data (7 excerpts from 7 sources).

Conclusion

The government is expected to be responsive to stakeholder questions and concerns regarding the policy process and implementation, host joint stakeholder reviews, and adaptively manage policy development and implementation. However, a majority of the key informants considered that the government's mutual accountability is poor. Often it lacks collaboration, and the roles and responsibilities are not clear in the policy. The lead sectors do not know their roles and responsibilities and do not know DRM is their responsibility, too; hence poor DRM mainstreaming.



Figure 21: Mutual Accountability by Region

Donor Coordination and Collaboration (Sub-Element 6.2)

There is a process for donor participation in the policy process and aligning government and donor objectives and priorities. Donor programs should contribute directly to host country strategies, plans, and objectives and are coordinated across donors to avoid duplication. This may include the signing of cooperation frameworks that indicate a joint commitment to specific policy change goals. Overall, donor coordination and collaboration were judged as emergent, progressing to expanding (see Fig. 20-22).

The maturity rating score varies depending on the level of assessment and stakeholder groups. For example, federal level KIs rated this sub-element as expanding while the sub-national level KIs rated it as emergent. Similarly, donors, implementing partners, and academia rated donor coordination and collaboration as expanding, while other stakeholders, including DRMC, judged the score as emergent, progressing to expanding (see Fig. 20-22).

Donor Accountability

Respondents in the Lead Sector and at the regional level indicated that donors play a major role in modeling coordination and collaboration because of their ability and focus on accountability. One respondent shared, "*Donors' accountability is now good. They take control of each and everything. They see and confirm that everything is being used for its intended purpose. If there is a problem, they ask. They also want and make tasks to be done properly. With regard to donors, there is accountability. Therefore, we can say it is expanding. The reason for saying it is expanding is because of the fact that sometimes there are some [organizations] that are not accountable like the government.*" Other respondents shared similar sentiments, particularly that donors are better at coordination and collaboration because of their behaviors to follow up on activities and take account of the resources they have allocated to DRM.

Coordination Mechanisms and NGO Engagement

Stakeholders from primarily the federal and Amhara regions indicated that various coordination mechanisms have been put in place to simplify facilitation, streamline efforts, and organize DRM aid work at the national, regional, and sub-regional levels of Ethiopia. The mechanisms mentioned spanned the DRM Technical Working Group, the National DRR Coordination Platform, clusters, the Rural Development Food Security platform, the DAG (Development Assistant Group), the UN Humanitarian group, the Humanitarian International Non-Governmental Organizations forum, the CCRDA (Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations), and more informal groups. Among these groups, Stakeholders, especially IPs, Lead Sector representatives, and EDRMC representatives, highlighted that coordination of NGO engagement has helped to ensure better accountability, information sharing, and communication regarding needs and lessons learned.

Regular Check-Ins

Part of what has made coordination successful, according to respondents from the Amhara, Somali, and federal levels, has been the regular check-ins that happen to ensure that there is a common understanding among attendees of what each actor or sector is doing to avoid duplication. While not independently triangulated, some respondents did mention that partners are made accountable if they miss meetings since coordinators call them and ask why they missed the last session and share any action points assigned.

While the IAA Framework defines donor coordination and collaboration as there being a process for donors to participate and align objectives and priorities and donor contributions to host country strategies, respondents did not always distinguish between policy development and DRM implementation itself. Regarding collaboration more generally, sources indicated that there is limited collaboration in terms of sharing policy priorities and objectives as donors have very limited direct contact at regional and woreda levels (23 excerpts, 21 sources). Most of the respondents shared that it is easier to answer questions in terms of their relationship with IPs, specifically NGOs, and no respondents from regions or woredas mentioned a name of a donor that they collaborate with on a specific issue. Where collaborations exist, especially at the federal level, participants voiced concerns such as the intention of influencing one another and conflict of interest. For instance, one respondent said, "*rather than donors and government sharing their priorities and objectives with each other, it is more about influencing one another...There is an effort in terms of donor activities coordinated to avoid duplication. For instance, BRE is the result of that effort. But it is not satisfactory. It is not at the expected level.*"

No Regular Coordination Meeting

Interviewees also admitted that there are no regular coordination meetings between donors and the government, but there are occasional consultative workshops and joint monitoring and evaluations at the federal level among IPs and government officials (28 excerpts, 25 sources). It was observed that respondents frequently confused donors with NGOs or IPs. The lack of these regular meetings may be a partial result of the government not effectively playing its role of facilitating coordination and collaboration, limitations in terms of monitoring and evaluation, and frequent reshuffling of authorities (12 excerpts, 11 sources).

Collaboration Delays

Collaboration is also challenged as donors and IPs wait for the government to declare emergencies while the government holds or delays such declarations. One respondent expanded on this by sharing, "*NGOs/Donors wait for declaration of disaster emergency by the government to respond. Many NGOs believe in emergency declaration. Declaration implies it is beyond my capacity, please help me. Otherwise, they do not listen to you. However, the government does not do it and tries to handle it even by stopping the existing projects. Hence, leave alone developmental activities and early warning, donors put prerequisites during emergencies. They wait until the government cries out...The major focus of the NGOs, and donors is disaster responses. This is what should be examined seriously.*" As a result, the collaboration effort is undermined as each party sticks to its approach, and each tries to respond to disasters in its own way.

Conclusions

From this assessment, we conclude that, though not as strong as it was previously, donors' coordination and collaboration are relatively better than other stakeholders and can be taken as exemplary. They play a major role in modeling coordination and collaboration because of their ability and focus on accountability. The practice of follow-up on activities and regular check-in with other stakeholders and taking account of the resources improves accountability. There are a number of coordination mechanisms already in place which simplify facilitation, streamline efforts, and organize DRM aid work at the national, regional, and sub-regional levels. Coordination of NGO engagement has also helped to ensure better accountability.

However, a number of challenges also exist, hindering effective collaboration between donors and governments. For example, currently, the government-donor coordination meeting is not regularly planned and conducted, there is limited collaboration in terms of shared priorities and objectives, governments' capacity to coordinate is poor, and there is no strong system to ensure mutual accountability.

Private Sector Accountability (Sub-Element 6.3)

Overall, the private sector accountability maturity was rated as not yet present. All KIs at all levels of assessment, in all regions, and from all stakeholder groups except the private sector actors rated this sub-element as not yet presented. The private sector actors rated their accountability as emergent (see Fig. 20-22).

Good Private Sector Engagement

Some participants shared that private sector actors were engaged in Ethiopian DRM policy design through reflections on the challenge they experience with other stakeholders on DRM; sharing ideas for the policy framework; and participating during emergency times for fundraising, resource mobilization, and other activities (8 excerpts from 8 sources). One key informant confirmed, "*The private sector is better performing in the activities of resource mobilization. They*

instantly respond at times need arises. Even their level of mutual accountability is better than the government and NGOs. Unfortunately, all that they have been doing is confined to resource mobilization. They are not participating in the planning activities."



Figure 22: Mutual Accountability by Stakeholder Group

Limited Private Sector Engagement

One-third of the respondents that were interviewed cited that there is either very limited engagement of the private sector in DRM work or a lack of engagement entirely (46 excerpts, 45 sources). A fuller explanation is unclear, but several respondents cited that there is a gap in the government's ability to identify and invite private institutions, that the structure for engaging these actors is insufficient for doing so at scale, that the private sector's roles and responsibilities for DRM Policy are unclear, or that the private sector is not interested in the longer-term engagement in the DRM space. One respondent shared, "*We have started inviting private sectors but they were not interested in structure procedures and their intervention is one shot support for people in need. They are business organizations and they are not interested in the process... hey were willing to [gather and donate requested supplies] and they have attended two/three meeting but they dumped the materials and left us.*"

If the private sector is involved, it is often to provide materials: Many of our respondents also highlighted that when the private sector does get involved, it is often to provide materials in the form of in-kind food and non-food items and cash donations for emergency response after a disaster has occurred or participating in ECC meetings to help support logistics of resource transfer, not in taking action or preparing before something becomes a problem. This lack of

structured engagement also translates into a lack of the private sector being incorporated into the DRM policy framework—while actors believe that the private sector should engage in DRM theoretically, there is little formal policy to help hold them accountable for any specific roles or responsibilities.

Accountability Mechanisms for Private Sector Actors are Lacking

When asked about the accountability of the private sector, respondents indicated that the accountability mechanisms for private sector actors are non-existent or seriously lacking. Basic communication with these actors is seriously limited (see Lack of Engagement finding for more). For those they can reach, regions may request private sector actors' emergency plans regarding an issue, but there is nothing holding those business organizations accountable for whether or not they actually implement anything. This effectively means that they could tell GoE or NGO counterparts one thing and do something entirely different or not at all with nothing holding them to their word. This is a challenge for both direct support and indirect support as NGOs may seek to purchase goods for distribution, but with no quality standards or accountability mechanisms in place, there is no guarantee that it is money well spent. One respondent shared, *"Accountability [for the private sector] is often indirect. For example we often purchase different seeds from private sectors [as an NGO/CSO]. Accordingly if we find a defective seed for instance; there is no way that holds them accountable. There is even more difficulty in taking the case to the court. It is therefore difficult to say there is accountability of the private sectors."*

Conclusion

The private sector is an important stakeholder in the DRM space, and its importance has already been indicated in the Sendai Framework. However, from this assessment, we conclude that either their engagement is very limited or a lack of engagement entirely. If they are involved, it is often during emergency responses for fundraising, resource mobilization, and other activities like transporting logistics, not in the pre-disaster phase. Their participation in the policy design is also almost none. This might be due to the selective engagement practice discussed under Policy Element 3 that stakeholders' engagement is based on their capacity and financial resources to commit to the design and implementation process. As private sector actors are local stakeholders and their availability at the sub-national level is reliable, their closer engagement is vital for effective and sustainable implementation.

CSO Sector Accountability (Sub-Element 6.4)

The private sector accountability maturity was generally rated as not yet present, progressing to emergent (see Fig. 2). At the level of assessment and by all stakeholder groups in all regions, this sub-element was rated either not yet present or emergent. Federal level KIs rated it as emergent but not yet present at the sub-national level. Donors, IPs, and CSOs rated it emergent, while KIs from other stakeholders, including DRMC, rated it not yet present (see Fig. 20-22).

Good CSO Accountability

When looking to CSOs for accountability, respondents indicated CSOs' engagement and participation in Ethiopian DRM policy agenda design with good representation at the regional level (19 excerpts from 19 sources). Though some respondents identified CSOs as accountable more generally (3 excerpts, 3 sources), others highlighted positive contributions to DRM implementation through resource allocations (8 excerpts, 8 sources). The IAA Framework does not include processes generally when considering CSO accountability, but several interviewees specifically highlighted that CSOs have stricter rules and regulations to follow with mechanisms for recourse if needed (6 excerpts, 6 sources). One participant shared, *"The CSO are more exposed for accountability because they are under strict control of the governmental agency which is*

especially established for this purpose. Not only the established agency but also other bodies watch the CSOs for their mistakes."

To be considered accountable, CSOs need to do some combination of engaging in dialogue, providing evidence-backed policy inputs, and/or being receptive to feedback from collaborators. In the case of Ethiopia, sources shared that CSOs did not have any engagement at all in the DRM policy design and implementation process in Ethiopia from inception to intervention (21 excerpts from 21 sources). This may have partially resulted from the fact that there is little communication between CSOs and the government, and their relationships are somewhat weak (9 excerpts, 9 sources). Additionally, CSOs were invited to engage only in some cases like during emergency cases, meetings, resource mobilization, service provision, etc. (5 excerpts from 4 sources). The lack of engagement also extended beyond policy design and implementation to CSOs not participating in DRM activities (5 excerpts from 5 sources).

Conclusion

Generally, CSOs are relatively accountable for their roles and responsibilities as they have more control from the government side and as they are dependent on budgets that are committed by different donors. However, similar to the private sector actors, CSOs' engagement in the design and implementation is very poor; they are rarely invited to the policy design and implementation process. However, those few who got a chance to participate have been accountable. They fill the government's gaps in DRM policy implementation and share and mobilize resources. They have good representation at the regional level, even if it is reduced at the federal level. But the lack of engagement platforms prohibits CSOs from fulfilling their accountability.

Policy Element 6 Recommendations

1. EDRMC should broaden its engagement with private sector actors and CSOs to ensure more inclusivity in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the DRM policy. By doing so, it would allow for an opportunity to utilize these stakeholders' potential capacities; local CSOs staff often work at the grassroots level, have community-level experience, and have the private sector actors' availabilities at every level with fundraising capacity. This can be strengthened by developing a multi-stakeholder database, including private sector actors and CSOs.

2. The USAID/SDRM-SI Project, together with other donors and their implementing partners, should consider advocating with the Government to open more space for the private sector and CSO engagement at both the national and sub-national levels through different engagement platforms, including workforces and steering committees. This way, it will help CSOs working at the sub-national level to work and provide DRM-related services better directly to the people in the communities. By involving them in the policy design and implementation process, the private sector and CSOs can align their activities and strategic plans to fit with the DRM policy and strategy.

Interviewee Suggestions and Recommendations

During and after the interview protocol was implemented in the evaluation teams' discussions with interviewees, respondents identified and suggested the following recommendations: strengthen stakeholder participation in the DRM policy design and implementation process, conduct capacity-building activities so as to enhance staff DRM-related skills, encourage sub-national level stakeholders to participate in the design and implementation of the DRM policy, strengthen the capacity of the DRM offices in terms of logistics and resources, strengthen and decentralize the DRM financial management system, strengthen the DRM monitoring and evaluation system, strengthen resource mobilization, accountability, and coordination efforts for the DRM policy implementation.

Consolidated and Prioritized Recommendations

The following recommendations have been consolidated and prioritized from all sections above, as well as sorted by the specific stakeholder best positioned to take adaptive actions to implement the recommendation.

Government of Ethiopia Prioritized Recommendations

1. EDRMC, which coordinates the DRM policy design process, should **ensure that adequate budget and other resources are secured before starting the policy design process with a strategic spend-down plan before policy reform efforts begin so that allocated funds can be activated for preparedness and response**. While including the DRM priorities into the country's ten-year development plan is a big achievement, EDRMC, donors, and IPs should **follow up and support the proper incorporation of DRM by the lead sectors into their own policy agendas and strategic plans with dedicated budget lines**. Capacity-building interventions should be provided to the Ministry of Planning and Development, Ministry of Finance, and other lead sectors to ensure strong management and implementation of the DRM mainstreaming plan and policy. Moreover, EDRMC should **strengthen its resource mobilization strategies and platforms to sustainably mobilize adequate resources for the DRM policy implementation**. Mobilization of the resources should be accompanied by an effective resource management strategy.

2. The Government of Ethiopia needs to **design technical capacity retention incentive packages to minimize high staff turnover and minimize the frequent shift of political leadership positions**, as well as the moving of EDRMC itself. Government leaders must **address issues contributing to turnover, including staff pay, benefits, and training offerings, to improve and implement a retention strategy**. Workers are going to continue to follow where they can get the best offer that matches their career goals, and if public service work is not competitive, then issues of high staff turnover will continue. Moreover, the government should **work with donors and implementing partners to arrange more in-service training for staff**, focusing more on the training of trainers for sustainability.

3. Government stakeholders in charge of the policy development process (e.g., DRM policy reform) should **leverage lessons learned from this instance where despite their intentions for inclusion, people with various identities did not feel heard or sufficiently involved**, and there remains an overwhelming perception that inclusivity is problematic. While the design cannot be changed at this juncture, policymakers should **identify actions to attempt to bridge the divide and strain caused in these relationships** if they are genuinely interested in collaboration and inclusion in the future, in particular with how the policy implementation roll-out is actioned. Ensuring that lessons learned and feedback shared from those included in the policy design process will go a long way in demonstrating transparency from design through implementation and could contribute to a multiplying effect for buy-in among stakeholder groups if included.

USAID/Ethiopia Prioritized Recommendations

1. The USAID/SDRM-SI Project, through its DRM-CB Activity, should continue to **support EDRMC to strengthen its resource mobilization and efficient resource management**

capacity. In the interim, while they build up resource mobilization, it is imperative that donors and partners **continue to allocate funds to support disaster response and enhance the DRM policy implementation**. USAID can continue to do this through working with partners to ensure there are effective resource management mechanisms, leveraging the DRM-CB/BRE Activity to continue their work supporting the DRM policy reform and DRM financing efforts, and integrating this evidence and capacity-building interventions into the Disaster Response Activity.

2. Regarding technical capacity-building efforts for GoE staff, USAID/SDRM-SI and their IPs should **support GoE staff retention capacity through human resource management capacity-building through its implementing partners** (e.g., DRM-CB, DRM-PYL, SDRM-SI DE, and other complementary Activities). The Mission should also robustly support and adaptively manage the PYL Activity to support capacity-building.

3. USAID/SDRM-SI Project, in collaboration with Government and other donors, should **strengthen, leverage, and, where possible, consolidate coordination structures/platforms** such as UN-facilitated clusters, DRM Cluster Committee meetings, Regional DRM counsel, woreda-level steering committees, etc. to coordinate DRM policy design and implementation. Moreover, USAID/SDRM-SI project, other donors, and their respective implementing partners should **encourage the Government of Ethiopia to conduct After Action Reviews and support adaptive cycles implementing the lessons learned, such as replicating/continuing effective coordination mechanisms during more stable times as well**. Similarly, the Government of Ethiopia, particularly EDRMC, should strengthen effective, transparent, and consolidated communication channels between and among the different DRM stakeholders.

Other Actors Prioritized Recommendations

1. Donors and IPs working in the DRM sphere should **strengthen DRM capacity-building trainings for the political leaders and awareness-raising efforts across GoE line ministries**. Political leaders aware of the different phases of DRM and the importance of managing risks over crisis could be willing to commit more resources. In this regard, the USAID PYL Activity should consider short-term in-service trainings for political leaders and provision of DRM fellows to line ministry offices at the sub-national level, in addition to DRM-specific offices.

2. All DRM stakeholders, including GoE, donors, NGOs, and other stakeholders, should **make sure their DRM-related intervention/activities are transparent**. One can ensure transparent implementation by **clearly indicating the outline of workflows, explaining the need for transparency to DRM stakeholders and staff, establishing individual roles and responsibilities, explaining changes, strengthening existing collaboration platforms**, including regular meetings and information sharing among stakeholders, and ensuring accountabilities.

Annexes

Annex 1: The IAA Tool

The Institutional Architecture (IA) Framework was utilized to guide the data collection and analysis. The IAA tool has different components, including the policy element and sub-elements (the concept), the definition given for the concept, examples to explain the concept further, and maturity questions and maturity rating options. Once the respondent rated the policy element, there was a follow-up question to solicit explanations as to why the respondent rated it that way. Below we have included the full tool for those who may be interested.

Policy Element	Definition	Example	Question	Maturity Rating
1. Guiding Policy Framework	Refers to a strong **set of legal processes, actions, and articulated roles and responsibilities** that underpin policy development, coordination, implementation, and accountability mechanisms that collectively form a cohesive guiding policy framework		How would you rate the maturity of Evidence-Informed DRM Policy-Making in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			

1.1 Clearly Defined and Consistent Policy Framework	The policy framework that outlines and supports policy-making is detailed in a clear and concise way that is **easily understandable** and is **applied and enforced across the policy agenda** from year-to-year.	• Clearly defined, accessible legislative requirements • A political process that allows for dialogue to discuss and resolve differences and move forward, or • The presence of a dispute resolution process	How would you assess the maturity of a Clearly Defined and Consistent DRM Policy Framework in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
1.2 Transparency of the Policy-Making Process	The policy development process is **known to all engaged stakeholders**, and pertinent information and changes to the process are **communicated openly and clearly** to all stakeholders in accordance with the rules contained within the country's constitution, basic law, and elsewhere in the formal legal framework.	• Policy process information sharing mechanisms in place • Policy process information-sharing mechanisms are regularly used in a timely fashion to inform all involved stakeholders of changes, updates, and adaptations to the guiding framework, or • The public has the opportunity to comment on draft policies, laws, and regulations (such as comment period, non-state actor (NSA) or multi-stakeholder fora, governmental website or social media feedback fora)	How would you assess the transparency of the DRM policy-making process in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
1.3 Clearly Defined Institutional Responsibilities	Institutional roles and responsibilities (including those of the legislature and judiciary) are well articulated, understood by all relevant parties, and applied across the policy agenda from year-to-year.	• A body with the mandate to introduce and manage the DRM policy-making process • Functional subcommittees for key technical areas (e.g., agriculture, nutrition), or • Clear involvement/support from the legislature, judicial institutions, budget office, and other institutions	How would you assess Clearly Defined Institutional DRM Responsibilities in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples that come to mind?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
2. Policy Development and Coordination	Policies are designed in adherence to the **guiding policy framework** and a set policy agenda with systemic organization and communication between the **national and regional levels** and with all relevant stakeholders.	N/A	How would you rate the maturity of DRM Policy Development and Coordination in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
2.1 Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed	An approved/official **multi-sectoral and multi-year plan** specifies **policy priorities and objectives** and guides policy and program development and implementation.	Government agencies and departments which **implement and utilize multi-year plans** to guide policy and program development Private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs) that represent member interests and provide input that helps inform priorities and planning	How would you assess DRM Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples that come to mind?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
2.2 Established Policy Process with Dedicated Resources	There is a detailed and legally supported set of actions founded on the guiding policy framework, which outlines how to develop DRM policy. This established policy process has committed resources, including a coordination unit dedicated to carrying out the policy-making process and funding allocated to support policy-making processes.	• A coordination unit dedicated to carrying out the policy-making process • Human resources assigned to represent their agencies from key government ministries • Funding allocated to support DRM policy-making processes • Legislative staffers who provide or pull in expertise for legislative decision-making	How would you assess Established DRM Policy Process with Dedicated Resources in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
2.3 Coordination Process	There is a process for effectively aligning institutional roles and responsibilities and involvement of various actors in the DRM policy-making process led by a government entity, such as a coordination unit or task force with a mandate to coordinate the policy-making process, including between the county/regional and national government and involvement of all relevant stakeholders throughout.	• A government-led entity, such as a coordination unit or task force with a mandate to coordinate the DRM policy-making process • Channels or fora used for coordination among stakeholders • Regular coordination between Local (or Regional) and National governments	How would you assess the DRM Coordination Process in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples that come to mind?	***Transcribe their comments:***			

2.4 Technical Capacity	Relevant institutional representatives have the skills and knowledge to draft effective, transparent, inclusive, and actionable policies and effectively implement their institutional roles and responsibilities outlined in the guiding policy framework. Stakeholders (government and non-governmental alike) have the skills and capacity to discuss in a productive manner contentious and differing policy perspectives in order to make decisions on policy change.	• Stakeholders have the skills and capacity to discuss in a productive manner contentious and differing policy perspectives in order to make decisions on policy change • Government personnel involved in policy change have the capacity to involve all relevant stakeholders and coordinate effectively throughout the policy process • Relevant institutional representatives have the skills and knowledge to draft effective, transparent, inclusive, and actionable policies • Legislature, judicial, and other relevant institutions have the capacity and authority to support the policy process as needed based on their roles and responsibilities	How would you assess the DRM Technical Capacity in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
2.5 Political Will	There is supportive leadership pushing desired policy reforms as a priority area, including commitment of resources and personnel and intentional building of public will.	• The Prime Minister's Office is supportive of DRM policies that cut across ministries (such as trade, health, and agriculture). • There is supportive leadership pushing desired DRM policy reforms as a priority area, including commitment to dedication of resources and building of public will.	How would you assess DRM-related Political Will in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

Policy Element	Definition	Example	Question	Maturity Rating
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
3. Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement	All stakeholders (private sector actors, CSOs, marginalized groups, various political groups, etc.) are intentionally and systematically involved consistently in all aspects of the policymaking and implementation process, provided the tools and resources to do so meaningfully, and their contributions are integrated into the policy framework, process, and content.		How would you rate the maturity of Inclusivity and Stakeholder Engagement in the DRM space in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			

3.1 Inclusive Participation in the Policy Process	Inclusion is factored into the guiding policy framework, coordinating implementation, and is a determinant of the policy development process. Ways of engaging in policy development and implementation are co-designed and initiated with sufficient timing to best enable participation.	• Inclusion is considered and incorporated into the guiding policy framework • Inclusion is a determinant in the policy development process • Inclusion is factored into coordinating the implementation • Inclusion underpins monitoring and evaluation design and implementation	How would you assess Inclusive Participation in the DRM Policy Process in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
3.2 Accessible Policy Information (*framework, process, and content)	Information pertaining to the policy framework, policy process /coordination, and policy content are readily available and intentionally disseminated in a timely manner to all stakeholders to support engagement. Policies and any materials relevant to the policy process and its creation are accessible in languages (or formats for visually impaired or illiterate stakeholders) of stakeholders.	• The policy framework and process for engaging are publicly available. • Policies and any materials relevant to the policy process and its creation are accessible in languages (or formats- for visually impaired or illiterate stakeholders) of stakeholders. • Clear communications are delivered through the appropriate channels and in a timely fashion for their audience (e.g., farmers and rural people) to access them, and best enable participation.	How would you assess Accessible DRM Policy Information in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
3.3 Multi-level, Equitable Stakeholder Participation	Stakeholder engagement is consistent, equitable, and meaningful for all stakeholders (including marginalized groups) throughout policy development and implementation.	• Consistent engagement of stakeholders at multiple levels • Reduction of barriers that enable real engagement (translations, process, location, etc.) • Equitable participation of relevant marginalized and key groups (beyond the private sector and CSOs) • Ways of engaging in policy development and implementation are co-designed and initiated with sufficient timing to best enable participation	How would you assess Multi-level, Equitable Stakeholder Participation in the DRM space in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?				
3.4 Depth and Impact of Participation	Engagement of all relevant stakeholders from policy development through policy implementation is verified, and inputs of stakeholders are reflected in policy process decisions and policy content.	• Engagement of all relevant stakeholders from policy development through policy implementation • Inputs of stakeholders are reflected in policies • Policy implementation is supported by relevant stakeholders (increased ownership)	How would you assess Depth and Impact of Participation in the DRM space in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
4. Evidence-informed Policy-Making	Policies are developed using relevant data and evidence to ensure contextually relevant and actionable policies that are effective and efficient based on existing knowledge of what works and does not work in the relevant sector(s).		How would you rate the maturity of Evidence-Informed DRM Policy-Making in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?				
4.1 Evidence Generated in a Timely Manner	Data is regularly produced on policy implementation (e.g., a national database), and research and analyses pertinent to policy decisions are commissioned from credible research institutions. Sharing of relevant data, research, and analysis is done in a timely manner to inform policy decision-making.	• Resources allocated for undertaking relevant research and analysis • Research and analyses commissioned from credible research institutions • Sharing of relevant research and analysis in a timely manner to inform policy decision-making.	How would you assess DRM Evidence Generated in a Timely Manner in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
4.2 Quality Evidence is Available, Accessible, and Trustworthy for/about DRM Policy-Making	Relevant and current evidence is gathered using accepted data gathering methods, data interpretation is transparent and unbiased, and evidence is translated into accessible forms for a variety of audiences.	• Relevant and current data gathered using accepted data gathering methods • Relevant and current evidence shared with all stakeholders • Appropriate interpretation of data • Translation of data into accessible forms for a variety of audiences	How would you assess Quality Evidence for DRM Policymaking in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
4.3 Evidence Regularly Incorporated into Policy Decisions	Few/no policy decisions are taken without reference to relevant supporting evidence.	• Evidence is cited during policy decision-making • Policy decisions are informed by research and analysis • Few/no policy decisions are made without reference to relevant supporting evidence	How would you assess Evidence Regularly Incorporated into DRM Policy Decisions in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

Policy Element	Definition	Example	Question	Maturity Rating
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
4.4 Capacity to Generate and Use Quality Evidence	The Government has the capacity to monitor and evaluate policies and programs and know when additional evidence may need to be commissioned. All stakeholders have the knowledge and skills to connect evidence to relevant policy considerations.	• Organization(s) representing the private sector have the capacity to present analysis supported by evidence to influence government-led discussions on policy • CSOs have the capacity to present analysis supported by evidence to influence government-led discussions on policy • The Government has the capacity to monitor and evaluate policies and programs • Stakeholders have the knowledge and skills to connect evidence to relevant policy considerations	How would you assess Capacity to generate and use quality DRM-related evidence in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			

5. Policy Implementation	Policies are enacted in a clear manner based on predetermined plans with multi-stakeholder ownership, sufficient capacity and resource commitments of relevant government institutions, and reliable feedback loops for adaptive management.		How would you rate the maturity of DRM Policy Implementation in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
5.1 Implementation Plans Developed	The policy in question has been broken down into programs and projects that have a sufficient level of detail to permit implementation and "packaged" priorities can be translated into funding proposals to gain support for projects/programs from development partners (to address financing gaps).	• Implementation plans are approved/official • Implementation plans are multi-sectoral, multi-year • Implementation plans specify priorities and objectives and guide policy and program development and implementation • Implementation plans clearly define lead ministries/responsible units for cross-sectoral programs and projects • Implementation plans reflect the role and impact on the private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs)	How would you assess DRM Policy Implementation Plans Developed in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
5.2 Implementation Capacity	The policy in question has been "packaged" into priority projects that can be managed by ministerial units, which have the necessary skills and knowledge to carry out their roles and responsibilities for policy implementation effectively.	• A government led-entity tasked with implementing policy decisions • Entities with relevant expertise for policy implementation, including adaptive management skills • Capacity to submit proposals and secure funds to address financing gaps	How would you assess DRM Policy Implementation Capacity in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
5.3 Policy Implementation Resources Committed by Host Country	Resources are committed by the host country to implement the identified policy agenda. Over time, the country's budget is adjusted to provide adequate financing for the implementation of actions required to implement policy priorities. Budget documents, including budget proposals, are released fully and in a timely manner.	• Over time, the country's budget has been adjusted to provide adequate financing for the implementation of actions required to implement policy priorities • Committed government budget to implement policy decisions	How would you assess DRM Policy Implementation Resources Committed by the government in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
5.4 Transparent Policy Implementation	Monitoring data and analysis of policy implementation results are shared with stakeholders, and evidence-informed adaptations to anticipated policy implementation are discussed with relevant stakeholders (as applicable) and clearly communicated.	• Monitoring data and analysis of policy implementation results are shared with stakeholders • Evidence-informed adaptations to anticipated policy implementation are discussed with relevant stakeholders (as applicable) and clearly communicated	How would you assess Transparent DRM Policy Implementation in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
5.5 Monitoring and Evaluation Design and Implementation	Capacity exists within the public sector, private sector, or civil society to review the effectiveness and impact of policy changes through good performance monitoring measures and targets which have been developed and are utilized to analyze the implementation of policies/plans.	• Specific objectives, performance indicators, and targets are incorporated in national policies and plans • Government systems are in place to monitor, collect data, analyze the results, and communicate (internally and externally) policy/ program effectiveness through the M&E framework	How would you assess DRM-related Monitoring and Evaluation Design and Implementation in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
6. Mutual Accountability	Government and policy stakeholders co-implement the policy process and policy implementation, responsive and supportive of each other's roles and responsibilities concerned with policy-making.		How would you rate the maturity of Mutual Accountability in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
6.1 Government Accountability	The Government shows responsiveness to stakeholder questions and concerns regarding the policy process and policy implementation, hosts joint stakeholder reviews, and adaptively manages policy development and implementation.	• Joint stakeholder reviews of policy implementation • Adaptive management of policies and programs based on monitoring and evaluation data • Government responsiveness to stakeholder questions and concerns regarding the policy process and implementation	How would you assess DRM-related Government Accountability in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

Policy Element	Definition	Example	Question	Maturity Rating
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
6.2 Donor Coordination and Collaboration	There is a process for donor participation in the policy process and for aligning government and donor objectives and priorities. Donor programs should contribute directly to host country strategies, plans, and objectives and are coordinated across donors to avoid duplication. This may include the signing of cooperation frameworks that indicate a joint commitment to specific policy change goals.	• Regularly scheduled donor-government meetings • Donors and government actors share their priorities and objectives with each other • Donor activities coordinated to avoid duplication • Donors and governments (including local government authorities) share learning to build off of each other's work	How would you assess Donor Coordination and Collaboration in the DRM space in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			

6.3 Private Sector Accountability	The private sector constructively engages in dialogue with other stakeholders, provides evidence-backed policy inputs, and is receptive to feedback from other stakeholders involved in policy-making/implementation. Private sector investors report to relevant stakeholders on investment commitments, if applicable.	• The private sector constructively engages in dialogue with other stakeholders • The private sector bases its policy inputs on data/evidence • Feedback is provided to the private sector by other stakeholders • Private sector investors report to relevant stakeholders on investment commitments, if applicable	How would you assess Private Sector DRM-related Accountability in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information
How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***			
6.4 CSO Sector Accountability	The Civil Society Organization (CSO) sector constructively engages in dialogue with other stakeholders, provides evidence-backed policy inputs, and is receptive to feedback from other stakeholders involved in policy-making/implementation.	• The CSO sector constructively engages in dialogue with other stakeholders • The CSO sector bases its policy inputs on data/ evidence • Feedback is provided to CSOs by other stakeholders	How would you assess CSO Sector DRM-related Accountability in Ethiopia?	• Not Yet Present • Emergent • Expanding • Advanced • Institutionalized • N/A or Insufficient Information

How did you come to this rating? Are there examples?	***Transcribe their comments:***

Annex 2: Tableau Dashboard

The evaluation team has input the IAA information into a Tableau dashboard for additional visualizations and customization. Below is just one example of the way that readers can view the overarching data, and the team encourages other experimentation with those interested.



For any further questions about this assessment or the SDRM-SDE, please contact:

DE Team Lead - Dr. Yitbarek Woldetensay at
ywoldetensay@headlightconsultingservices.com

DRM Specialist - Yomif Worku at
yworku@headlightconsultingservices.com

Senior Technical Backstop - Rebecca Herrington at
rherrington@headlightconsultingservices.com

DE Admin Lead - Chelsie Kuhn at
ckuhn@headlightconsultingservices.com

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